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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
The fundamental question presented by this case is whether
the State and/or its employees are to be held liable for the
independent criminal acts of a person because that person was
or at one time had been under the dominion of the State's
criminal justice and corrections system.

The issues on appeal

are whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment
in favor of respondent State of Utah, and whether the lower
court erred in denying summary judgment to the individual state
employees.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an action for damages for personal injury suffered

by the plaintiff when she was shot by the defendant Kenneth
Roberts.

Plaintiff also sued the State and several of its

individual employees alleging negligence in deciding to parole
Roberts and to release him to a halfway house.
The District Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of the
State of Utah, and in favor of William Milliken, as Director of
the Utah State Division of Corrections, Leon Hatch, as Deputy
Warden of the Utah State Prison, and Weldon Morgan, as Director
of the Ogden Community Corrections Center, in their representative capacities.

Appellant appeals that judgment as of right.

The lower court, however, denied Summary Judgment for
Milliken, Hatch and Morgan in their individual or personal
capacities, and this Court granted their petition for interlocutory appeal.

The lower court also granted Summary Judgment

in favor of Milliken, Hatch and Morgan on the issue of simple
negligence, holding that they could only be liable for "gross
negligence," and this Court granted appellant's petition for
interlocutory appeal on that issue.
All appeals, whether of right or interlocutory, were
consolidated, and for the purpose of the consolidated appeals,
plaintiff below will appear as appellant and the State defendants as respondents.

Andrew Gallegos, named below individ-

ually and as the Director of the Department of Social Services,
was dismissed and that dismissal is not challenged.

Kenneth

Roberts and his wife, Felicia, were not concerned with the
summary judgment motions below and are not parties to this
appeal.
B.

Facts of the Case.
On December 22, 1982, Kenneth Roberts ("Roberts") was

transferred from the Utah State Prison to the Ogden Community
Correction Center, a halfway house.

This transfer was to pre-

pare him for an August 9, 1983 parole date which had previously
been granted by the Board of Pardons.

In the early morning

hours of December 24, 1982, while apparently under the influence of drugs, Roberts shot the appellant.
-2-

Organizational Structure of Utah Corrections System1
1.

The Governor of Utah administers the state corrections

system through the Department of Social Services, whose Director in 1982 was Andrew Gallegos.

The Department oversaw the

Division of Corrections, whose Director in 1982 was respondent
William Milliken.

The Division operated a number of facilities

and organizations including the State Prison, the halfway
houses, and Adult Probation and Parole.
2.

The prison was operated under the direction of the

Warden, Kenneth Shulsen, who was statutorily empowered with the
ultimate authority and responsibility for the housing of
inmates.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-13-10 and 11 (1977).

Warden

Shulsen directly delegated the responsibility for decisions
affecting prisoner classification to the Associate (or Deputy)
Warden, respondent Leon Hatch.2

(Deposition of Kenneth

Shulsen, at 6 and 9).

A chart illustrating the organization of the Utah
corrections system as it existed in December 1982 is
attached hereto as Appendix "A," and is also found in
Record on Appeal at 271. The corrections system has
undergone some reorganization since that time. The facts
set forth herein describe the system as it existed in 1982.
The decision to release inmates from the corrections
system is made by the State Board of Pardons, which is a
separate entity from the Division of Corrections and
answers only to the Board of Corrections and the Governor. The Board of Pardons has virtually unrestricted
discretion in determining how long an inmate will stay in
prison and in setting parole dates.
-3-

3,

The men's facility at the prison is divided into min-

imum, medium and maximum security cell blocks.

Within medium

security is a block of cells known as "protective custody,"
which houses inmates who, for whatever reason, need protection
from the general inmate population.
4.

Each prisoner at each level of confinement is reviewed

and classified, or rated, for advancement within the system;
good behavior brings greater freedom, responsibility and benefits.

Initial recommendations for inmate classifications were

made by the inmate's Unit Management Team (UMT), which met
weekly to review inmates.

The UMT was comprised of the Cell

Block Captain, lieutenants, case workers and psychologist, all
of whom worked daily with the prisoners.

(Id.

at 12-13; Depo-

sition of Laddie Pruett, at 4). These classification recommendations were then referred to the prison's Administrative
Review Board (A.R. Board), previously called the Executive
Classification Committee.

The Chairman of the A.R. Board was

respondent Leon Hatch, the Associate Warden, who was responsible for the administration of inmate classification.

Other

voting members of the A.R. Board included Eldon Barnes, Director of Prison Security; Richard Barnhart, Sr., Director of
Medium Security; and Fred Hurst, Director of Minimum Security.
Other members of the prison staff were invited to attend A.R.
Board meetings and give input regarding prisoners.

-4-

The staff

members were sometimes asked to join in the vote and to give
the Associate Warden additional input in deciding difficult
classification cases.

(Deposition of Leon Hatch, at 15-16;

Deposition of Kenneth Shulsen, supra).
5.

Once an inmate was given a parole date by the Board of

Pardons, he could be re-classified and transferred to a Community Corrections Center (halfway house).

The Community Correc-

tions Centers Administration, a subdivision of the Division of
Corrections separate from the State Prison, and its Director
Robert Anderson, were responsible for the five Centers in the
state.
Center.
6.

Respondent Weldon Morgan was director of the Ogden
(Deposition of Robert Anderson, at 43-44).
Prior to 1982, the five individual Center Directors

worked directly with the prison staff, including Unit Management Teams, in making recommendations to the A.R. Board for the
transfer of those prisoners who had received parole dates.
This method, however, sometimes resulted in disputes between
Directors when the same prisoner was "approved" by more than
one Director for transfer to more than one facility and encouraged maneuvering by directors in attempts to obtain the best
inmates for their facility.

(Deposition of John Powers, at

39-41).
7.

Thus, in mid-1982, John Powers, a veteran Corrections

employee, was appointed by Robert Anderson to develop a new

-5-

method of screening prisoners for transfer to the Centers.
Powers became Chairman of the Community Corrections Centers
Screening Committee, with an office at the prison, and he was
to be the liaison between the Centers and the Prison A.R.
Board.

The Committee consisted of representatives from each of

the five Centers and the Committee was to meet regularly to
consider candidates for transfer to the halfway houses.

(Id.

at 8-10 and 38).
8.

The Community Corrections Centers Administration main-

tained an appropriate consistency of operations throughout the
various Centers, yet permitted the individual Directors latitude within their professional judgment and discretion to deal
with the problems of their particular situation and residents.
Each of the Centers had its own policies and procedures manual.
(Id. at 33-34) .
Kenneth Glen Roberts
9.

Roberts was born in Payson, Utah, in 1950.

He came

from a broken home and spent his adolescent years in and out of
the State Industrial School.

(Utah State Board of Pardons File

on Kenneth Roberts, Presentence Report, Nov. 20, 1967, Record
on Appeal, at 272-76).
10.

In 1967, Roberts, then 17, and two companions broke

into an apartment, raped a woman, and stole her jewelry and

-6-

car.

Roberts was certified to stand trial as an adult, pled

guilty, and was sentenced to ten years to life.
11.

(Id.).

Roberts was paroled from prison in March 1973, after

serving five years.

His parole was later revoked after he was

arrested and convicted for an armed robbery in May 1973. He
received an indeterminate sentence for that offense of five
years to life. After serving five years, he was paroled in
December 1978. Nine months later he pled guilty to burglary
and rape, and was given a one to fifteen year sentence for each
offense.

(Utah State Board of Pardons File, Miscellaneous

Documents I, Record on Appeal, at 278-82).
12.

During his second term at the prison, Roberts testi-

fied against another inmate who was charged with a murder at
the prison.

Thereafter, Roberts was placed on protective

custody and remained there until his transfer to the Ogden
Community Corrections Center in December 1982.

(Kenneth

Roberts Prison Jacket, C-Notes file, June 5, 1975 entry, Record
on Appeal, at 283-84).
13.

Roberts underwent a psychiatric evaluation at the Utah

State Hospital in Provo, Utah, from December 1979 to February
1980.

Tests performed at that time showed that Roberts had an

I.Q. of 126 and was "of superior intelligence, having the ability to do college level work and . . . beyond."

Roberts had

completed high school and several semesters of college credit

-7-

while incarcerated in the state prison.

On February 9, 1980,

Roberts ran away from the State Hospital, but was apprehended
almost immediately and transferred back to prison.

(Utah State

Hospital File on Kenneth Roberts, Psychological Assessment,
Jan. 15, 1980, Record on Appeal, at 285-89; Utah State Board of
Pardons File, Miscellaneous Documents II, Record on Appeal, at
290-95) .
14.

Felicia Santos Roberts is a New York native who grad-

uated from Brigham Young University with a degree in applied
sociology.

Following graduation, she accepted employment at

the Utah State Hospital as a psychiatric aide, and met Roberts
there while he was undergoing psychiatric evaluation.

After

Roberts returned to prison, they corresponded daily, and ultimately were married in September 1980. They were divorced in
1983.

(Deposition of Felicia Santos, at 2-8).
Roberts' Transfer to Ogden Center

15.

Felicia Roberts first contacted Gary Webster, the

Executive Secretary of the Board of Pardons, almost nine months
prior to her September 1980 marriage to Kenneth Roberts.

(Utah

State Board of Pardons File, Miscellaneous Documents II,
supra.)

Both she and Roberts lobbied Webster and the members

of Roberts' Unit Management Team at the prison, telling them of

-8-

the changes Roberts was making in his attitude and behavior, in
an effort to have Roberts' parole rehearing date moved up.
(Deposition of Felicia Santos, at 30 and 40)

Laddie Pruett,

Roberts' case worker, also noted positive changes in Roberts'
behavior and attitude

and wrote a favorable report to the

Board of Pardons. At a redetermination hearing in March 1982,
the Board moved Roberts' rehearing date up to August 1982.
(Utah State Board of Pardons File, Miscellaneous Documents III,
Record on Appeal, at 296-312).
16.

The Board of Pardons met to consider Roberts for

parole on August 18, 1982.

(Id.).

Roberts was serving time

for his third felony conviction, as were nearly 65% of the
other prison inmates.

Roberts had served nearly 66 months on

his first felony (rape), over 60 months on his second felony
(robbery), and would have served 36 months on his third conviction (burglary and rape).3

(Id.; Affidavit of Christine

Nearly half of the inmates were serving time on at
least their fourth conviction and more than one third had
five or more felony convictions. Division of Corrections
statistics also show that from October 1982 to October
1984, inmates released from the Utah State Prison had
served, on average, less than 32 months for rape, less than
36 months for robbery, and less than 25 months for
burglary. See Utah State Corrections Annual Report, infra,
at p. 66, Record on Appeal, at 352. Thus, prior to
Roberts' transfer to the Ogden Community Corrections Center
on December 22, 1982, Kenneth Roberts was a statistically
average inmate who had served his time.
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Mitchell, Ph.D., and accompanying Utah State Corrections Annual
Report 1984, Record on Appeal, at 313-355).
17.

The staffs of both the prison and the Board of Pardons

had recommended an August, 1984 parole date.

However, the

Board of Pardons, apparently impressed by Roberts' record of
improvement, his demeanor at the hearing, and the appearance
and support of his wife, set an earlier parole date of
August 9, 1983.

(Board of Pardons File, Miscellaneous

Documents IV, Record on Appeal, at 356-368).
18.

After the Board set the new parole date, Felicia

Roberts contacted Weldon Morgan at the Ogden Halfway House.
She told him of Roberts1 parole date and asked about the possibility of Roberts being accepted at Morgan's facility.

Morgan

had known Roberts at the State Industrial School and told
Felicia that if Roberts had not changed from his days at the
State School, he would be reluctant to accept Roberts at the
Center.

(Deposition of Felicia Santos, at 40-41; Deposition of

Weldon Morgan, at 19).
19.

On August 31, 1982, the Community Corrections Centers

Screening Committee considered, and denied, Roberts1 request
for transfer to the Ogden Center.

Roberts had a pending

disciplinary action arising from an altercation at the prison
which made him ineligible for transfer, and some committee
members were not convinced Roberts was an acceptable candidate.

(Deposition of John Powers, at 9).
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20.

The pending disciplinary action against Roberts was

later dropped when he was found not at fault in the altercation.

In early October 1982, Roberts' Unit Management Team

recommended to the A.R. Board that Roberts be transferred to
the Ogden Center.

The team members felt that Roberts had

indeed changed his attitude and behavior since his marriage to
Felicia.

He had earned the highest classification level for

protective custody, served as both the unit clerk and school
teacher (for high school equivalency courses), and counseled
other prisoners in a program he helped design to get them off
of protective custody and back into the prison community.
also became involved in voluntary group therapy.

He

The psycho-

logical evaluations performed on Roberts by the Unit psychologist, Merril Lee Rasmussen, and her contacts with him through
group therapy, convinced her that Roberts was sincere, that he
had made significant positive changes, and that he was determined to succeed on the outside.

The members of Roberts' UMT

felt that his chances would be improved if he had the advantage
of living in a halfway house environment prior to parole
release, which was less than a year away.

Felicia Roberts'

presence and employment in Ogden, as well as her support for
Roberts and her persistent lobbying on his behalf, were also
viewed as favorable factors by the UMT.

(Kenneth Roberts

Prison Jacket, C-Notes file, supra; Deposition of Merril Lee

-11-

Rasmussen, at 66-69; Deposition of Laddie Pruett, at 10-13;
Deposition of Bruce Daniels, at 39-40).
21.

However, at its weekly meeting on October 8, 1982, the

A.R. Board denied the UMT's recommendation for transfer.
Roberts and Felicia were both upset by the A.R. Board's decision.

Felicia phoned William Milliken, Director of Correc-

tions, and complained that Leon Hatch, the Associate Warden,
was prejudiced against her husband and was not giving him fair
treatment.

(Kenneth Roberts Prison Jacket, Miscellaneous File,

Administrative Review, Oct. 8, 1982, Record on Appeal, at
369-71; Deposition of Felicia Santos, at 22-25; Deposition of
Bruce Daniels, at 38).
22.

Milliken called Hatch to follow-up on Felicia Roberts'

accusation, as he did with many inquiries he received about
inmates.

Milliken did not ask Hatch to do anything particular

for Roberts; he called simply to get information about Roberts'
status so that he could relay that information to Felicia.
Hatch, however, acknowledged some prejudice about Roberts and
agreed to reschedule him for review in December.

(Deposition

of William Milliken, at 8-14; Deposition of Leon Hatch, at
70-75).
23.
Morgan.

Felicia also contacted Roberts' UMT and Weldon
She told Morgan that Roberts had indeed changed since

his days at the State Industrial School.
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Based on Felicia's

representations and favorable reports on Roberts received from
the prison, Morgan agreed to accept Roberts at the Ogden
facility if he were approved by the A.R. Board.

(Deposition of

Weldon Morgan, at 20-21; Deposition of Marvin Hansen, at 7).
24.

The UMT again submitted Roberts' name to the A.R.

Board the first week of December for transfer to Ogden.

The

A.R. Board met on December 10, 1982, and considered Roberts'
case as one of about ninety classification changes. Roberts'
proposed transfer was discussed at length, and as he sometimes
did with difficult cases, Associate Warden Hatch opened the
voting to all those in attendance.

The majority of those

present favored transfer, although Eldon Barnes, a member of
the A.R. Board, testified that he thought Roberts' transfer was
denied.

Hatch had to leave the meeting, and later asked Barnes

to sign the type-written results of the meeting.

Barnes' sig-

nature appears on the classification review sheet showing
Roberts' transfer was approved.

(Deposition of Leon Hatch, at

19 and 98; Deposition of Eldon Barnes, at 48).
25.

Once approved by the A.R. Board, Roberts was cleared

for immediate transfer to Ogden, subject to availability of
space.

Weldon Morgan called John Powers, Chairman of the Com-

munity Corrections Centers Screening Committee, on December 17,
and asked Powers to complete the necessary arrangements for
Morgan to pick up Roberts on December 22.
Weldon Morgan, at 23-26).
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(Deposition of

26.

John Powers did not convene the Community Corrections

Centers Screening Committee prior to approving Weldon Morgan's
decision to accept Roberts' transfer to Ogden.

Powers was

convinced by his conversations with Morgan that Morgan was
agreeable to working with Roberts.

Powers agreed that the

Ogden Center presented the best chance for Roberts to succeed:
Morgan knew Roberts, he had a track record of success with
difficult cases, and Roberts' wife was living and gainfully
employed in Ogden.

Powers was certain that the other Directors

would acquiesce in Morgan's judgment and his desire to work
with Roberts, and would approve the transfer.

Roberts would be

paroled soon in any event, and the purpose of the halfway house
was to do what it could to prepare inmates for life on the
outside.
27.

(Deposition of John Powers, at 40-45).
Weldon Morgan picked up Roberts at the prison and

transported him to Ogden on December 22. During the drive to
Ogden, Morgan had a long talk with Roberts and as a result
Morgan's feelings were reinforced that Roberts was sincere
about changing his life and making the most of this opportunity.

Upon arrival at the facility, Morgan discussed the

halfway house rules with Roberts and reviewed the Resident
Contract Roberts was required to sign acknowledging that he
understood the rules and would abide by them.

Morgan then

called Felicia at work and told her Roberts was at the center;
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she arrived shortly thereafter.

(Deposition of Weldon Morgan,

at 36-40).
28.

The Ogden Center was scheduled to close for the

Christmas holiday, allowing both residents and staff to spend
the holiday with family.

Felicia had told Weldon Morgan how

excited she was to spend a belated honeymoon and Christmas with
her husband.

Prior to releasing Roberts to go with his wife,

Morgan reviewed the rules with Roberts and Felicia and gave
each of them his business card, and his home phone number,
instructing them to call him if they needed help or had any
problems over the holiday.

(Deposition of Weldon Morgan, at

39-40).
29.

Roberts was allowed to leave the Center that same

afternoon (the 22nd) with Felicia to attend to some personal
matters.

He was to return to the facility by 11:00 p.m. that

night, which he did, without incident.

Felicia did not notice

anything unusual about Roberts that evening and there is no
indication he consumed any drugs or alcohol.

(Deposition of

Felicia Santos, at 116-17).
30.

The next morning, December 23, Roberts left the Ogden

Center with Felicia.
December 25.

He was to return by 11:00 p.m. on

Roberts says that he obtained some drugs from

another inmate (whom he refuses to identify) prior to leaving
the facility.

(Deposition of Kenneth Roberts, at 76-81).
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31.

Upon leaving the Center, Roberts and Felicia ran some

errands and then returned to Felicia's apartment where Roberts
took a shower and Felicia left to go to the bank.

Roberts

testified that while Felicia was gone he started ingesting
drugs, beginning with an amphetamine (Preludin).

He says that

he took large quantities of amphetamine throughout the day
while he and Felicia made a trip from Ogden to Provo and back.
During this time they visited friends, and bought and delivered
Christmas gifts.

Felicia did see Roberts take seven or eight

of her amphetamine diet pills, smoke some marijuana and drink
two or three cans of beer over the course of the day's
activities.

According to Felicia, however, Roberts drove all

day without noticeable adverse effect.

(Deposition of Felicia

Santos, at 52-56; Deposition of Kenneth Roberts, at 80-87).
32.

While returning to Ogden, Roberts told Felicia that he

wanted to have a party that night.

They stopped at a friend's

house and, upon Roberts' request, Felicia invited her friend to
the party and asked her if she had any marijuana.

The girl

denied the party invitation but did provide some marijuana.
(Deposition of Felicia Santos, at 57-60).
33.

Roberts and Felicia went on to their apartment, arriv-

ing at about 10:00 p.m.
for their holiday meals.

Felicia left to buy beer and some food
Upon Roberts' request, she again
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stopped at her girlfriend's home and asked her to come back to
the apartment for a party.

While Felicia was gone, Roberts

claims he ingested PCP ("angel dust").

(Deposition of Kenneth

Roberts, at 87-88; Deposition of Felicia Santos, 57-60).
34.

When Felicia returned, she saw Roberts peering out of

the bedroom window through the curtains with the bedroom lights
out.

As she entered the apartment, Roberts came out of the

bedroom with a rolled up sleeping bag and asked for the keys to
her car.

He refused to tell her where he was going and left at

about 11:00 p.m. in Felicia's red Pontiac, the registration of
which listed the address of Roberts' brother.

She later

recalled that Roberts had asked her that morning where she kept
her .357 pistol and he told her that they would have to get rid
of it because it violated the halfway house rules.

Felicia

then discovered the gun was missing; apparently Roberts had
hidden it inside the rolled up sleeping bag and taken it with
him.

(Deposition of Felicia Roberts, at 59-62).
35.

Inexplicably, Felicia did not call Weldon Morgan at

that time to tell him what happened.

Instead, she called some

friends in Salt Lake City, one of whom told Felicia not to
worry, that Roberts would not do anything stupid and that he
just needed to get away for awhile to do some thinking.
Felicia sat up all night waiting for Roberts to return home.
(Id. at 65-67).
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36.

In the morning Felicia received a call from Roberts'

brother in Salt Lake City.

He informed her that he had been

visited by the police, who had traced the red Pontiac, and that
Roberts was the prime suspect in several crimes.

Only then did

Felicia call Weldon Morgan at home, at approximately 9:30 a.m.
on December 24th.
37.

(Id.).

Roberts' recollection of the 12 hour period from the

time he left Felicia's apartment until he was arrested the next
day is spotty, disjointed and confused.

It appears that some

time after he left the apartment, Roberts took a hallucinogenic
drug called "MDA."

Roberts had never taken MDA or the PCP

ingested earlier, before.

He told police after his arrest that

he was high on drugs and alcohol.

(Deposition of Kenneth

Roberts, at 93-94; Board of Pardons File, Police Reports,
Record on Appeal, at 375-81).
38.

The first thing Roberts remembers after leaving the

apartment in Ogden is being pulled over by a police officer in
the Salt Lake City area.

While talking to the officer, "some-

thing clicked" in his mind and he became paranoid that the
police, including this particular officer, wanted to kill him.
Roberts was prepared to shoot the policeman, but the officer
did not arrest Roberts, and he went on his way.

After that,

however, Roberts was convinced that the police were after him,
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"herding" him to a specific location where they would kill
him.

(Deposition of Kenneth Roberts, at 90-102).
39.

At about 3:20 a.m., Roberts entered the plaintiff's

neighborhood in the south part of Salt Lake valley.
police car patrolling the area.

He saw a

Still under the influence of

drugs, and still paranoid, he randomly turned into a cul-de-sac
and spotted LaDawn Prue getting out of her car.

He jumped out

of his car, put the gun to her head and ordered her into his
car; he wanted a hostage to help him escape the police dragnet
which was closing in on him.

(Id.,

at 101; Board of Pardons

File, Police Reports, supra).
40.

Even though plaintiff was complying with Roberts'

orders, he inexplicably shot her twice and left her lying in
front of her home.

Later he broke into a home only to be con-

fronted and chased away by the woman of the house; he then
robbed a woman at gunpoint, kidnapped a different woman, had a
shoot-out with police, and finally surrendered at 11:00 a.m.
that morning on a road a short distance from the State Prison.
(Deposition of Kenneth Roberts; Board of Pardons File, Police
Records, supra).
41.

Roberts pled guilty to five felony charges arising

from the crime spree:

attempted criminal homicide, aggravated

burglary, armed robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and being a
habitual criminal.

He is presently incarcerated in maximum
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security at the Utah State Prison with a Board of Pardons first
review date of 1998.

(Board of Pardons File, Miscellaneous

Documents V, Record on Appeal, at 382-85).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Fundamental public policy issues are inextricably interwoven with the legal issues presented by this case.

While

considering the scope of governmental immunity, the meaning of
discretionary function, and common law official immunity, this
Court must also give consideration to the purposes and prospects for corrections in this state, to the allocation of risks
associated with the corrections and criminal justice systems,
as well as the disparate roles of the judicial, legislative and
the executive branches of state government.

Recent legislative

changes in sentencing parameters and the resulting over-crowded
conditions at corrections facilities, the consequential
unavoidable early release of adjudicated prisoners, with the
concomitant risk of crimes being committed by these early
releasees, require that greater consideration be given to the
underlying policy and legal issues here than might otherwise be
the case.
Specific provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
and authoritative case law hold that respondents are not liable
for the independent criminal acts of a third person, at least
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where government employees acted within the scope of their
employment, committed no willful or malicious wrong, and
exercised discretion.
A recent decision of this Court, Doe v. Arguelles, infra,
upon which appellant bases virtually her entire case, is not
consistent with recent developments in the law of governmental
immunity and discretionary function.

Although Doe v. Arguelles

was a logical, albeit radical, extension of predecessor cases
dealing with these issues, the opinion was written without the
benefit of briefing on the recent significant changes in federal case law interpretation of these same legal principles.
In view of this Court's longstanding precedent of following the
lead of federal interpretation in this area, the recent federal
developments require a re-evaluation of Doe v. Arguelles.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND DISPOSITIVE CASE LAW BAR APPELLANT'S CLAIMS
A.

The Act's Three-Step Test for Governmental Immunity.

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act") codifies the
common law principle that a governmental entity is generally
immune from suit. The Act then establishes a three-step test
for determining whether immunity applies in a particular case:

-21-

(1)

The first step is to determine whether the injury

complained of resulted "from the exercise of a governmental
function."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (Supp. 1983).

If so,

there is immunity from suit.
(2)

Step two is to determine whether immunity is waived by

the Act for the particular governmental function in question.
Both the Act and cases interpreting the Act instruct that any
waiver must be strictly construed, and that an explicit expression of waiver and satisfaction of any qualifiers enumerated in
the waiver itself must precede application of the waiver.

Utah

Code Ann. §§ 63-30-3, 4 and 15; Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d
627 (Utah 1983); Holt v. Utah State Road Comm'n, 511 P.2d 1286
(Utah 1973).
(3)

The third step is to determine whether the waiver of

immunity is subject to any exception.

For example, if the

waiver in question is that found in Section 10(1) of the Act,
waiving immunity for injuries "proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope
of his employment," it remains to be determined whether any one
of the exceptions enumerated there retains immunity.
1.

Step One:

Governmental Function.

Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
states:

"Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all
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governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which
results from the exercise of a governmental function. . . . "
The Utah Supreme Court has declared that:
There can be no question but that the maintenance of a
state prison and the keeping of prisoners therein is a
necessary auxiliary of government and therefore a
governmental function, nor that consequently the performance of the duties incident thereto would normally
be protected by the traditional rule of sovereign
immunity.
Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367, 368 (1968).
In 1980, the Supreme Court formulated a test for determining whether the activity of a governmental entity is an exercise of a governmental function and thus entitled to immunity.
In Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah
1980), the Court wrote:
We therefore hold that the test for determining
governmental immunity is whether the activity under
consideration is of such a unique nature that it can
only be performed by a governmental agency or that it
is essential to the core of governmental activity.
Id. at 1237. The Court expanded on this test a year later:
The first part of the Standiford test — activity
of such unique nature that it can only be performed by
a governmental agency — does not refer to what government may do, but to what governmental alone must do
. . . . [T]he second part of the Standiford test
"essential to the core of governmental activity" — ,
. . . refers to those activities not unique in themselves (and thus not qualifying under the first part)
but essential to the performance of those activities
that are uniquely governmental.
Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1981)
(emphasis in original).
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While Sheffield predates Standiford and Johnson, there
nevertheless should be no doubt of the correctness of
Sheffield* s conclusion:

"that the maintenance of the State

Prison and the keeping of prisoners therein is a necessary
auxiliary of government and therefore a governmental function."

It is self-evident that the apprehension, prosecution,

confinement, punishment, and rehabilitation of criminals is
peculiarly the province of government.

These are precisely the

types of activities which are uniquely governmental, something
that "government alone must do" in the discharge of the
Constitutional mandate to provide for the general welfare, and
deserving of the immunity provided by the Act.
2.

Step Two: Waiver.

Appellant's Amended Complaint makes no reference to any
express waiver of immunity upon which suit can be brought.
However, the nature of her claims could rely on no waiver other
than that found in Section 63-30-10(1) of the Act.

Like the

other express waivers set forth in the Act, the express waiver
of Section 63-30-10(1) has significant and unavoidable qualifiers attached.

Failure to satisfy the qualifications for

waiver set forth in this section means simply that the waiver
does not apply and that immunity remains.

The waiver, with its

three qualifiers underscored and identified, reads as follows:
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Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for injury [1] proximately caused [2] by a
negligent act or omission of an employee [3] committed
within the scope of his employment . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (emphasis added).
The Legislature specifically limited this particular waiver
to situations where a "negligent act or omission" of a government employee, acting within the scope of his employment,
"proximately caused" the injury complained of.

Proximate

causation and negligence are legal terms of art that the Legislature is presumed to have used knowingly and purposefully.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11.

This waiver, therefore, cannot apply

where any of these three specific gualifiers are unsatisfied.
First, it must be found that an employee or the entity owed
a duty to the injured party.

The existence of a legal duty

running from defendant to plaintiff is a reguisite element of
any negligence claim, Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250 (Utah
1979), and, where no legal duty exists, no legal causation is
recognized.

Where there is no legal causation, as a matter of

law, there can be no proximate causation.

See Prosser, Hand-

book of the Law of Torts, 244 (4th ed. 1971).
The issue of existence of duty is a guestion of law for the
court.

See Metropolitan Gas Repair Service, Inc. v. Kulick,

621 P.2d 313, 317 (Colo. 1980); Moewes v. Farmer's Insurance
Group, 641 P.2d 740, 741 (Wyo. 1982); 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence
§ 34 (1971).

A finding by this Court that the defendants owed
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no duty to plaintiff precludes application of the waiver of
Section 63-30-10(1), and immunity remains.

Conversely, a find-

ing that a duty exists requires an assumption that the waiver
of immunity cited above applies, and would then require consideration of the enumerated exceptions to the waiver which are
found in subsections (a) through (1) of Section 63-30-10(1),
Because respondents believe that several Utah Supreme Court
decisions dealing with the enumerated exceptions to the waiver
of immunity are dispositive of this case, it will be presumed,
for the purposes of this portion of the argument only, that a
duty exists, that the waiver of Section 63-30-10(1) applies,
and that the enumerated exceptions to the waiver should be
considered.
3.

Step Three:

Exceptions to the Waiver.

Section 63-30-10(1) lists several distinct, well-defined
exceptions to the general waiver of immunity for employee negligence.

These exceptions are listed in the alternative rather

than conjunctive, and thus only one need apply to void the
waiver.

In cases with facts remarkably similar to the instant

case, both of which are discussed below, this Court has applied
two of these exceptions to preserve immunity.
The waiver and the two exceptions read as follows:
(1) Immunity from suit of all government entities is
waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent
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act or omission of an employee committed within the
scope of his employment, except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function whether or not the discretion is abused, or

(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person _in any state prison, county or city jail or other
place of legal confinement . . . .
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-10(1)(a) and (j) (emphasis added).
These exceptions will be analyzed in reverse order.
B.

Incarceration Exception Bars Appellant's Claims.

In Emery v. State, 483 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1971), this Court
affirmed the dismissal of a claim against the State for the
death of a patient who was voluntarily confined at the State
Hospital.

Applying the exception of Section 63-30-10(1)(j),

the Court held that the statutory reference to "other place of
legal confinement," when read in its entirety, "obviously
referred to something other than a 'jail1 or 'state prison,'
including a hospital where one cannot be released without some
kind of permission."

483 P.2d at 1297.

Five years later, this Court reaffirmed Emery and held that
the arising-out-of-incarceration exception barred a claim for
the death of a woman killed by a prison inmate who had walked
away from his prison "work release" job shortly before the
murder.

Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976).
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In Epting,

prison officials had granted the prisoner the privilege of
participating in the prison's "work release" program.

The

prisoner was released from the prison each day, driven to work,
and then picked up after work and returned to the prison.

One

day, the prisoner walked away from his job and that evening
killed plaintiffs1 decedent.
The Epting plaintiffs claimed that the State negligently
failed to keep the prisoner incarcerated or under surveillance.

The Court affirmed a Summary Judgment in favor of the

State based on both the discretionary function exception and
the arising-out-of-incarceration exception.

With regard to the

incarceration exception, the Court declared:
As to the status of [the prisoner] vis-a-vis the state
prison, there seemed to be just two alternatives,
either: (a) he had totally escaped the control of the
prison and was thus acting on his own so the prison
was not responsible for him; or (b) he was still under
the control of the prison authorities so that his
conduct would "arise out of the incarceration of any
person in the state prison . . ."in which latter
instance the prison is immune from suit under the
statute.
Epting, 546 P.2d at 244.
Two other Utah Supreme Court decisions, Schmitt v.
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979), and Madsen v. State, 583
P.2d 92 (Utah 1978), are consistent with and support the holdings in Emery and Epting.

In Madsen, the wife and daughter of

a prison inmate who had died following surgery in the prison
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hospital filed a wrongful death action against the Utah State
Prison and selected employees. The Madsen Court concluded that
the plain meaning of the incarceration exception to the waiver
of immunity found in Section 10(1) of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act "reflects a legislative intent to retain sovereign
immunity for any injuries occurring while the incarcerated
person is in prison and under the control of the state."

583

P.2d at 93. The Court impliedly recognized that the inmate
technically was not incarcerated in the prison but rather confined to the hospital at the prison.
concluded:

The Court nevertheless

"Since this injury occurred while Madsen was under

the control of prison officials/ the governmental entities,
vis., the State of Utah and the Board of Corrections, are both
immune from liability."

583 P.2d at 93 (emphasis added).

Thus, reaffirming both the reasoning and conclusions of Emery
and Epting, the Madsen court held that it is the prisoner's
status and the state's control over the prisoner, rather than
merely the prisoner's physical location, which are critical to
the incarceration exception.

See also Schmitt, 600 P.2d at 518

(holding the State immune for loss of inmate's personal property) .
When Kenneth Roberts assaulted the appellant, he was an
inmate/resident at the halfway house facility in Ogden.

He had

not been paroled by the Board of Pardons and he could not leave
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the facility without permission.

He was still serving time as

an inmate under the jurisdiction of the State, see Utah Code
Ann. § 64-13-11, but in a corrections facility less restrictive than the State Prison.
The Ogden halfway house, if not an extension of the State
Prison itself, clearly constitutes an "other place of legal
confinement," as defined by this Court in Emery.
Roberts was incarcerated there.

Kenneth

Just as the injury in Emery

arose out of an incarceration in a "place of legal confinement"
other than a jail or a prison, the injury complained of by
appellant here arose "out of the incarceration" of Kenneth
Roberts at a "place of legal confinement."
The factual setting and plaintiffs' claims in Epting are
virtually identical to those of the instant case.
cases, the prisoner had not yet been paroled.

In both

In Epting,

prison officials granted Michael Hart, the prisoner, the privilege of participating in work release away from the prison.
Here, prison officials granted Kenneth Roberts the privilege of
transfer to a halfway house, where he was still "under the
control" of the state in a "prison . . . or other place of
legal confinement," as defined in Emery, Epting, and Madsen.
During Hart's employment away from the prison, he generally was
free to do what people outside prison do when they are gainfully employed.

During Roberts' Christmas leave from the
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halfway house, he generally was free to do what people outside
prison do during Christmas.

Hart walked away from his place of

employment and killed Mrs. Cynthia Epting Mitchell.

Roberts

left his apartment and his wife and shot LaDawn Prue.

As in

Epting, at the time Kenneth Roberts shot LaDawn Prue, either
(a) he had totally escaped the control of corrections authorities and was acting on his own, "so the prison was not responsible for him;" or (b) he was under the control of corrections
authorities and thus LaDawn Prue's injuries arose "out of the
incarceration of any person in the state prison . . . or other
place of legal confinement."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(j) .

Under either view, the State cannot be held liable for LaDawn
Prue's injuries.

To hold otherwise, this Court must, unavoid-

ably, overturn Epting, Emery and Madsen.
C.

Discretionary Function Exception Bars Appellant's
Claims.
1.

Epting v. State Is Dispositive Here.

This Court has been clear and consistent in its pronouncements that the decisions, programs and efforts of corrections
officials in attempting the difficult task of managing and
rehabilitating adjudicated criminals, require the exercise of
discretion.

Prisoner "rehabilitation is the responsibility of

professional men and the manner in which it is accomplished
must be a matter of discretion."
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Beal v. Turner, Warden, 22

Utah 2d 418, 454 P.2d 624, 626 (1969).

M

We think there is not

much doubt that the use of work release programs is a
worthwhile effort toward the . . . objective [of rehabilitation] . But that is within the discretion of the prison
authorities to decide."

Epting v. State, 546 P.2d at 244.

"[There] is the imperative need for those in a supervisory
capacity to have reasonable freedom to discharge the burdensome
responsibilities of keeping in confinement and maintaining
discipline of a large number of men who have been convicted of
serious crime."

Sheffield v. Turner, 445 P.2d at 369.

These declarations clearly enunciate that not only the
decision-making processes involved but also the actual operation of corrections facilities and the handling of prisoners
confined therein are discretionary and fall within the discretionary function exception of subsection (a) of Section
63-30-10(1).

In Beal, the Court enunciated the policy

affording this discretion:
The Board of Pardons and the men in the Adult
Probation and Parole Department are striving in a
professional way to rehabilitate adjudicated criminals, so that these criminals may take their place in
a law-abiding society. To accomplish this objective,
the Board of Pardons and the Adult Probation and
Parole Department must have leeway in taking chances
and enlarging the ambit of a promising prisoner,
[even] when the confidence which they had in the
parolee is [later] seen to be misplaced . . . .
Beal v. Turner, Warden, 454 P.2d at 626 (emphasis added).
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The

Epting Court also recognized the difficulties facing prison
authorities in developing rehabilitation programs and in applying those programs to particular prisoners.

The Court declared:

In regard to the problem: whether the placing of
a prisoner in a "work release" program comes within
subsection [(a)] above quoted as "the exercise . . . .
of . . . a discretionary function, . . . ," we make
the following observations: The prison authorities
are faced with a dilemma which has always existed in
penal institutions: As to what extent they are
furnishing an education for further crime, or for the
rehabilitation of prisoners into useful citizenship.
We think there is not much doubt that the use of work
release programs is a worthwhile effort toward the
latter objective. But that is within the discretion
of the prison authorities to decide. In addition to
the exercise of this judgment as to the value and
practicability of such a program generally, there are
problems about its advisability as to each individual
prisoner. In order to weigh the positive values of
possible benefit for him in such a program against the
negative factors such as the likelihood of his escaping and engaging in more anti-social conduct, it is
essential to consider the various aspects of his personality: his intelligence, aptitudes and qualities
of character such as honesty, integrity and industry;
and whether he has demonstrated a sincere desire to
rehabilitate himself so that there is a reasonable
probability that he will succeed. Accordingly, we
agree with the view of the trial court that the
handling of the prisoner Michael Hart was something
which "arises out of the exercise of a discretionary
function" for which subsection [(a)] of Section
63-30-10[(1)] quoted above has retained its sovereign
immunity.
Epting, 546 P.2d at 244 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Note that Epting framed the issue not in terms of whether
merely deciding to place an inmate in a work release program
was discretionary, but rather in terms of whether the actual
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placement of the inmate into the program was discretionary.
The Court, focusing on events which occurred after the decision
was made to place the inmate in work release and centering its
attention upon the the actual implementation of the work
release decision, held that the "handling of the prisoner" was
a discretionary function for which immunity was not waived.

Id.

Use of the phrase "handling of the prisoner," read in light
of the discussion of the inherent difficulty in dealing with a
particular inmate's personality, intelligence, potential for
rehabilitation, etc., and how and to what extent such programs
should be made available to that inmate, makes it clear that
the Epting Court used those broad words advisedly.

"Handling

the prisoner" must therefore include decisions regarding the
prisoner's classification within the system, implementation of
those decisions, supervising the prisoner's work release program, monitoring the prisoner's participation in work release,
granting freedoms commensurate with work release, and all other
activities undertaken by corrections officials in connection
with the incarceration and attempted rehabilitation of the
prisoner.
The facts of Epting, with no significant differences, are
the facts of the instant case.

The issues addressed by the

Epting Court, with no more than cosmetic alterations, are the
issues presented here.

Corrections officials' "handling" of
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Kenneth Roberts, including the decision to transfer him to a
halfway house and the monitoring of Roberts after his move to
the halfway house, cannot be distinguished from the "handling"
of Michael Hart in the Epting case.

Epting's holding that

"handling of the prisoner" on work release was a discretionary
function is consistent with Beal v. Turner, supra, and
Sheffield v. Turner, supra, and is dispositive of the discretionary function issue.
2.

Epting v. State Is Still Good Law.
Appellant argues that Epting is suspect and is no

longer good law.

Appellant asserts that some Utah Supreme

Court cases decided after Epting have applied an analysis of
the discretionary function exception different than that used
in Epting, and which, if applied here, would require this Court
to reverse Epting and rule that the discretionary function
exception does not apply.

Appellant misconstrues the law.

In the 1972 decision of Carroll v. State Road Comm'n, 27
Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972), the Utah Supreme Court held
that a State road supervisor's decision to use berms as the
sole means of warning travelers that a road was closed, was not
a basic policy decision essential to the realization or
accomplishment of some basic governmental policy, program or
objective.

496 P.2d at 891.

In arriving at this decision, the

court adopted a planning level-operational level dichotomy
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analysis.

Citing decisions from the Supreme Courts of Hawaii

and California, and making reference to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, which contains a discretionary function exception virtually identical to that found in the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, the Carroll Court discussed "the principle that although
basic policy decisions are allowed immunity, this exception is
not extended to the ministerial implementation of that basic
policy."

I_d.

Plaintiff relies upon this and similar state-

ments from Carroll and its progeny as support for the argument
that the discretionary function exception does not apply to the
facts of this case.
The Carroll Court, however, specifically concluded that:
[A] valid consideration in evaluating a factual situation was whether there was a reason for sovereign
immunity, i.e., did the employee's decision . . . rise
to the level of governmental decisions toward which
judicial restraint should be exercised.
Id.

This consideration evidently became a deciding factor when

the Court considered the facts of Epting nearly four years
later.4

Although not expressly stated in the Epting opinion,

the Court must have determined that the decisions made by the
defendants, including those at the lower levels of prison
administration, whereby Michael Hart was put on work release,

It must be presumed that the Epting Court, with four
of the five justices from Carroll still sitting, was well
aware of the Carroll decision.
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were decisions which rose "to the level of governmental decision toward which judicial restraint should be exercised," and
therefore constituted a discretionary function.

If the Epting

Court had determined otherwise, it would have reversed the
Summary Judgment granted in favor of the prison authorities.
Five years after Carroll and one year after Epting, this
Court analyzed "discretionary function" in Connell v. Tooele
City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977).

In Connell, the Utah Supreme

Court discussed in detail the distinction between "discretionary" and "ministerial" duties.

Adopting the distinction used

by Dean Prosser, the Court wrote:
. . . [A]cts which are regarded as "discretionary" or
"quasi-judicial" in character, require personal
deliberation, decision and judgment, and those which
are merely "ministerial" amount[] only to obedience to
an order, or the performance of a duty in which the
officer is left no choice of his own.
The reason for the distinction between discretionary and ministerial duties has been enunciated by
several authorities and we believe this distinction to
be necessary and sound. For if every employee or
officer of the government were to be held liable,
individually, for errors in judgment or exercise of
the discretion, which his employment requires him to
make, such employee would fear to make decisions and
the administration of government could be seriously
jeopardized. On the other hand, if the employee's
duties require no exercise of judgment or discretion,
the reason for protecting his actions does not exist.
572 P.2d at 699, citing Prosser, The Law of Torts, §§ 131-132
(4th ed. 1977).
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The conclusions in Epting are consistent with the analytical framework adopted by the Court in Connell for determining
whether particular responsibilities of government employees are
discretionary and thus immune from suit.

The "personal delib-

eration, decision and judgment" exercised by the respondents in
Connell, Epting, and in the instant case, constitute discretionary functions in fact and in law, consistent with this
Court's decisions regarding corrections activities.
Appellant argues in her Brief that the recent case of Doe
v. Arguelles, 25 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Dec. 27, 1985), in essence
overrules Epting and those cases which support it.

Contrary to

appellant's position, however, it is Doe v. Arguelles, and not
Epting, that is an aberration from the orderly development of
the law of discretionary function.
3.

Recent Developments in the Law Regarding Application of the Discretionary Function Exception
Support the Conclusions of Epting v. State.
(a)

Developments in the Law up to 1984.

Utah's discretionary function exception to the waiver of
immunity closely parallels the discretionary function exception
found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act
(the "FTCA").

Little v. Utah State Div. of Fam. Serv., 667

P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983).

The Utah Supreme Court "has followed

the lead of cases interpreting that act."
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Id.; Frank v. State,

613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980).

Indeed, this Court expressly

adopted the planning level-operational level test for discretionary function developed by some federal courts, which
distinguished "between those decisions occurring at a broad,
policy-making level and those taking place at the implementing
'operational' level."

Frank, 613 P.2d at 519.

See also,

Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980); Carroll v. State
Road Comm'n, supra.

This level-oriented, dichotomy approach

grants discretionary immunity to those decisions made at the
policy-making level, but denies immunity for acts and decisions
made at the implementing or operational level because such
decisions are "ministerial" rather than "discretionary."
As noted by this Court in Little, supra, the federal case
law interpreting the FTCA's discretionary function exception
began with Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).

In

Dalehite, claims against the United States were made under the
FTCA for damages resulting from an explosion of fertilizer
which had been manufactured and distributed under the direction
and control of the federal government.

In holding for the

government, the Court discussed at length the discretionary
function exception of the FTCA and held that
[T]he "discretionary function" . . . includes more
than the initiation of programs and activities. It
also includes determinations made by executives or
administrators in establishing plans, specifications
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or schedules of operations. Where there is room for
policy judgment and decision there is discretion.
346 U.S. at 35-36 (emphasis added).
The Dalehite Court did not stop at the "executive or
administrator" level, however, holding that:
It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in
carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable.
If it were not so, the protection of § 2680(a) would
fail at the time it would be needed, that is, when a
subordinate performs or fails to perform a causal
step, each action or nonaction being directed by the
superior, exercising, perhaps abusing, discretion.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

Even though the Court

refused "to define, apart from this case, precisely where discretion ends," id. at 35, the Court clearly and unambiguously
included within the parameters of discretionary function the
acts of subordinates implementing policy-level decisions of
superiors.
A number of federal courts following Dalehite, however,
tended to ignore the Dalehite holding immunizing subordinate
implementation of policy decisions, and instead focused
narrowly on one sentence, arguably dicta, found elsewhere in
the opinion:

"The decisions held culpable were all responsibly

made at the planning rather than operational level and involved
considerations more or less important to the practicability of
the Government's fertilizer program."

Id. at 42. With the

help of two post-Dalehite opinions from the Supreme Court,
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which were generally interpreted to veer away from the Dalehite
holding, Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1955), and Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d
62 (1955), aff'd per curiam sub nom., United States v. Union
Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955), the planning level-operational
level dichotomy approach to applying the discretionary function
exception of the FTCA began taking shape.
The post-Dalehite federal cases, for the most part, drew an
imaginary line between upper echelon planning level decisionmakers and lower level "operational" employees who were charged
with executing or implementing the policy, plan or program.
The decision-makers above the line were granted immunity pursuant to the discretionary function exception.

Those below the

line, and their activities, regardless of the discretion or
judgment involved, were labeled "ministerial" and subject to
liability.

See Allen v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 476 (D.

Utah 1981), and cases cited therein.

These federal cases

invariably cite Dalehite as the source of this level-oriented
dichotomy approach, but in doing so completely disregarded the
Dalehite Court's holding that "acts of subordinates in carrying
out the operations of government . . . cannot be actionable."
346 U.S. at 36.
The Utah Supreme Court followed the lead of these postDalehite federal decisions and adopted the dichotomy approach
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for interpreting and applying the discretionary function exception of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Beginning with

Carroll v. State Road Comm'n, supra, and followed by Frank v.
State, supra, and Bigelow v. Ingersoll, supra, this Court
struck a course consistent with federal case law applying this
dichotomy approach that finally reached its logical end with
Doe v. Arguelles in December of 1985.
That end result is a non-analytical, outcome-determinative,
conclusory approach not unlike the pre-Standiford v. Salt Lake
City Corp. "governmental capacity - propriety capacity"
distinction used by this Court to determine whether or not
certain activities were "governmental functions," as that term
was used in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

In Standiford,

Justice Oaks decried the governmental-proprietary distinction
as unsatisfactory, inconsistent, arbitrary, senseless and
incongruous.

605 P.2d at 1233-34. This Court, and numerous

others, had used the distinction as a "test" even though it
amounted to little more than justification for a conclusory
result.
The same holds true for the planning level-operational
level distinction used for determining discretionary function.
It is no longer a test (if it ever was), but is instead a justification for a result.

How the result is reached becomes

arbitrary and unpredictable.

This Court should jettison the
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planning level-operational level dichotomy approach for interpreting and applying the discretionary function exception, and
replace it with a true analytical framework.

The federal

courts, which created the planning level-operational level
distinction, have now done just that.

This Court should do the

same.
(b) Varig Airlines: A Unanimous United States
Supreme Court Discards the Planning LevelOperational Level Approach.
In United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense (Varig Airlines), 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984), plaintiffs
brought suit under the FTCA alleging that the Federal Aviation
Administration (the "FAA") was negligent in its inspection of
certain components of an airplane during the course of certificating the aircraft for commercial use.

The United States

Supreme Court reviewed in detail the legislative history of the
FTCA's discretionary function exception, quoted liberally from
Dalehite, and noted that the case law5 had veered from
Dalehite by adopting the level-oriented, dichotomy approach.
By unanimous decision, the Court declared that Dalehite "represents a valid interpretation of the discretionary function
exception."

Id. at 2764.

The Court isolated two determinative

The Court admitted that even its own reading of the
discretionary function exception "has not followed a
straight line" after Dalehite. 104 S. Ct. at 2764.
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factors that should be used "in determining when the acts of a
government employee are protected from liability by [the discretionary function exception]."

.Id. at 2765.

The first factor effectively prohibits consideration of the
actor's rank, or his hierarchical position within the decisionmaking process, in determining whether the discretionary function exception applies to that actor's decisions or activities.
Rather, the Court declared that "the basic inquiry concerning
the application of the discretionary function exception is
whether the challenged acts of a government employee—whatever
his or her rank--are of a nature and quality that Congress
intended to shield from tort liability."

.Id- (emphasis added.)

Evaluating the facts in Varig Airlines pursuant to this
factor, the Court held that both the governmental agency's
decision and the actual implementation of that decision by
agency employees were immunized from suit by the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA.

I^3« at 2768.

In Varig, the

FAA's employees were empowered to make judgments regarding
private persons' compliance with agency regulations, the need
for changes to maximize compliance, the types of changes necessary, and the allocation of agency resources.

The employees

"necessarily took certain calculated risks, but these risks
were encountered for the advancement of a governmental purpose
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and pursuant to the specific grant of authority in the regulations and operating manuals."

Id., at 2768-69.

Such, the Court

declared, "fall sguarely within the discretionary function
exception."

Id. at 2769.

By eliminating the relevancy of the rank of the actor,
Varig effectively eliminates any

rational basis for the

planning level-operational level dichotomy developed by some
federal courts and adopted by the Utah Supreme Court.

Varig

instead rejuvenates Dalehite and reguires a basic inguiry into
the "nature and guality" of the guestioned acts of government
employees, and prohibits the semantic gymnastics too often used
to distinguish an act of decision-making from an act of
implementing that decision.
Similar to those federal cases which ignored express
language in Dalehite, this Court, particularly in Doe v.
Arguelles, ignored language in Frank v. Sate that is remarkably
consistent with the first key factor delineated by Varig:
The exception to the statutory waiver here under consideration, however, was intended to shield those
governmental acts and decisions impacting on larger
numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseeable ways
from individual and class legal actions, the continual
threat of which would make public administration all
but impossible.
Frank, 613 P.2d at 520. This language in Frank and the
analysis in Varig are reminiscent of this Court's analysis in
Epting, Beal, and Sheffield: corrections activities, including
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the difficult task of rehabilitating criminals, are the "nature
and quality" of government functions which the legislature
intended to protect from judicial second-guessing.
The second determinative factor in Varig's analysis is as
follows:
[W]hatever else the discretionary function exception
may include, it plainly was intended to encompass the
discretionary acts of the Government acting in its
role as a regulator of the conduct of private individuals .
104 S. Ct. at 2765 (footnote omitted).

Where government

engages in corrections activities, government acts in "its role
as a regulator of the conduct of private individuals" very
possibly more than in any other activity.

Where the government

determines the extent to which it will supervise an individual
(which is precisely what the respondents did with Kenneth
Roberts), "it is exercising discretionary regulatory authority
of the most basic kind."

Id. at 2768.

See Jet Industries,

Inc. v. United States, 777 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1985)
(supervising and monitoring a federal probationer in the
Federal Witness Protection Program "involves the regulation of
the conduct of a private individual within the meaning of Varig
Airlines").
Applying these two factors to the facts in Varig, the
Supreme Court ruled that both the "decision to implement" the
FAA "spot-check" system of compliance review for aircraft, and
"the application of that . . . system to the particular
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aircraft involved . . . are barred by the discretionary
function exception to the Act."

104 S. Ct. at 2768.

The Varig

Court thus applied the holding in Dalehite and refused to
distinguish "discretionary0 decision-making and "ministerial"
implementation of those decisions.

To further emphasize the

Court's return to Dalehite and the eradication of the planning
level-operational level dichotomy approach to the discretionary
function exception, the Court made it clear that:
Judicial intervention in such decision making through
private tort suits would require the courts to
"second-guess" the political, social, and economic
judgments of an agency exercising its regulatory
function. It was precisely this sort of judicial
intervention in policy making that the discretionary
function exception was designed to prevent.
Id.

The Court emphasized that the FAA employees involved had

to make "policy judgments regarding the degree of confidence
that might reasonably be placed in a given manufacturer"; they
were required to allocate agency resources in an efficient
manner; and they were to attempt to "maximize compliance with
FAA regulations."

Id.

6

"It [therefore] follows," the Court

held, "that the acts of FAA employees in executing the
'spot-check* program . . . are protected by the discretionary
function exception as well."

Id.

One might similarly observe that corrections officials
are required "to make policy judgments regarding the degree
of confidence that might reasonably be placed in a given"
inmate, to allocate resources, and to attempt to maximize
inmates' compliance with programs of rehabilitation.
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The Dalehite holding, which for years was overlooked or
ignored by the federal courts, has found new life. Varig
Airlines has done to the planning level-operational level
distinction what Standiford v. Salt Lake City did to the governmental capacity-proprietary capacity distinction:

it

replaced an unsound, conclusory and non-analytical approach
with a reasoned framework of analysis by which sound legal
judgments and efficacious policy decisions may be made without
artificial, semantic distinctions.
(c) Application of Varig Airlines in the Federal
Courts
Since Varig, nine of the eleven federal circuit courts
considering discretionary function have applied the Varig/
Dalehite analysis and have abandoned the planning leveloperational level dichotomy approach.7

The Third Circuit

The federal appellate court decisions (listed
numerically by circuit) expressly applying the Varig test
for discretionary function are: Brown v. United States,
790 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1986); Shuman v. United States, 765
F.2d 283 (1st Cir. 1985); General Pub. Util. Corp. v.
United States, 745 F.2d 239 (3rd Cir. 1984); Baxley v.
United States, 767 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir. 1985); Ford v.
American Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1985);
Flammia v. United States, 739 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1984);
Feyers v. United States, 749 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1984);
Cisco v. United States through the E.P.A., 768 F.2d 788
(7th Cir. 1985); Cunningham v. United States, 786 F.2d 1445
(9th Cir. 1986); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States,
742 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1984); Russell v. United States, 763
F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1985); Ostera v. United States, 769
F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1985).
(continued)
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Court of Appeals, for example, observed in General Public
Utilities Corp. v. United States, 745 at 246 n. 8, that "our
pre-Varig cases on the discretionary function must be
re-evaluated."

The First Circuit, in Shuman v. United States,

765 F.2d at 209, noted that "after Varig, 'our canvas of
authorities is accordingly narrow.'"
The federal district courts have reacted similarly8 to
Varig.

The District Court in Kansas matter-of-factly ack-

nowledged that in Varig, "the Supreme Court rejected the
planning level/operational level line of cases adopted by
various courts."

Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp.

(continued)
Even prior to Varig, some federal courts saw problems
with the level-oriented discretionary approach. In 1980,
the Third Circuit characterized the planning level-operational level distinction as an ineffective "semantic
attempt to decide in which category [a] case falls."
Bernitsky v. United States, 620 F.2d 948, 951 (3rd Cir.
1980) .
See Chrisley v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 285
(D.S.C. 1985); In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litigation, 616 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Cal.
1985); Bradley v. United States, 615 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Pa.
1985); Ayala v. Joy Mfg. Co., 610 F. Supp. 86 (D. Colo.
1985); Cunningham v. United States, 625 F. Supp. 1016 (D.
Mont. 1985); Bosco v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 611 F.
Supp. 449 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Wendler v. United States, 606
F. Supp. 148 (D. Kan. 1985); Federal Sav. and Loan Ins.
Corp. v. Williams, 599 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Md. 1984);
Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 394 (D. Kan. 1984);
Jet Industries, Inc. v. United States, 603 F. Supp. 643
(W.D. Tex. 1984).
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at 434.

In Bradley v. United States, supra, the Court declared

that if any question remained as to the appropriateness of the
planning level-operational level test, "it has now been
definitively laid to rest by Varig."

615 F. Supp. at 206 n.2.

See also In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing
Litigation, 616 F. Supp. at 774 (the "continual vitality" of
the planning level-operational level distinction "was in doubt"
after Varig).
More important, however, than these decisions acknowledging
the demise of the planning level-operational level analysis, is
the manner in which the federal courts have been applying
Varig.

In Flammia v. United States, supra, plaintiff brought

an action against the government to recover damages for
injuries sustained when he was shot by a Cuban national named
Diaz who had been admitted into the United States by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (the "INS").
alleged that INS personnel were negligent in:

Appellant

(a) releasing

Diaz from its care, custody and control when it knew Diaz was a
felon convicted of a violent crime and had a propensity to
commit a similar crime in the future; (b) failing to maintain
supervision over Diaz after his release; (c) failing to notify
appropriate law enforcement agencies of Diaz's criminal record;
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and (d) failing to take Diaz into custody after Diaz had been
convicted of a felony in the United States.9

739 F.2d at 204.

The Flammia Court quoted extensively from Varig and held:
[0]n the basis of Varig Airlines we must reject
appellant's attempt to distinguish between high-level
decisions concerning the admission or release of Cuban
refugees in general and the specific operational decision to admit and release Diaz. . . . We view the
language of Varig Airlines to dictate that the exemption under the Federal Tort Claims Act derived from
this discretion extends to specific individual applications as well as to broad policies.
Id. (emphasis added).

The Flammia Court stated further that in

releasing and supervising foreign nationals, the INS was acting
"in its role 'as a regulator of the conduct of private individuals.,M

Id., at 205, quoting Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2765.

Thus, the Fifth Circuit Court applied the two tests from Varig,
i.e., the nature of the government conduct and regulation by
government of private individuals, to issues identical to those
presented by the instant case, found the discretionary function
exception applicable and dispositive, and affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims.

The first two allegations of negligence in Flammia are
identical to the allegations in the instant case, i.e.,
negligent release and supervision. Appellant here has
taken obvious care to describe these alleged negligent acts
in terms suggesting that such are operational in nature,
and thereby attempt to apply the planning level-operational level approach to discretionary function. The
plaintiff in Flammia likewise carefully characterized the
actions (or inactions) of INS personnel as operational, but
to no avail under the Varig/Dalehite analysis.
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The Eleventh Circuit, relying on Varig and Dalehite, did
likewise in Ostera v. United States, supra.

There, the FBI had

obtained the release from a South Carolina jail of an adjudicated criminal for use as an informant.

After his early

release, the informant attacked plaintiff, blinding him in one
eye.

Recognizing that down-line decisions and actions imple-

menting up-line decisions and policies cannot be arbitrarily
distinguished from those up-line decisions and policies for the
purpose of ascribing liability, the Ostera Court declared:
The decision to seek the release of an informant
from prison is inextricably intertwined in the decision
to use him as an informant. The decision to use a
particular person as an informant is inextricably
intertwined in the policy decision to use informants
for law enforcement purposes. "Where there is room for
policy judgment and decision there is discretion. . . . "
. . . Neither the decision to use a particular person
as an informant nor the decision to obtain release of
that person from prison is subject to judicial scrutiny. . ., the government being immune from suit. . .
under the discretionary function exception. . . .
769 F.2d at 718, quoting Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36.
The Ostera Court recognized that a decision to use an
adjudicated criminal as an informant cannot rationally be
differentiated from the actual use of that informant.

Simi-

larly, the decision to obtain the release of an inmate from
prison cannot be distinguished from the actual obtainment of
the release, except by post-Dalehite/pre-Varig reasoning.

The

Ostera Court and all other federal courts herein cited, by
barring claims for damages resulting from operational negligence, have discarded the judicially-created barrier between
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deciding policy and implementing policy.

So long as (a) the

acts in question are of the nature and quality the legislature
intended to protect from liability, (b) the acts involve
governmental regulation of private individuals, and (c) the
implementation of policy and goals has been left to the discretion of a governmental agency, then the implementation of
decisions or policy is protected by the discretionary function
exception,l°
One of the most recent and best-reasoned post-Varig decisions is Brown v. United States, supra.

In Brown, plaintiffs

were operating fishing vessels off the coast of Massachusetts
and were caught in a storm, resulting in loss of lives and

In Cisco v. United States through the E.P.A., supra,
the Court reiterated the general rule with regard to discretionary function analysis: "Whether the [government
agency] acted negligently or even abused its discretion
has no effect on the applicability of the discretionary
function exception." 768 F.2d at 789.
The Court in Cisco added that, after Varig, where
"Congress has left to the EPA to decide the manner in
which, and the extent to which, it will protect individuals and their property from exposure to hazardous
wastes," the agency's actions fall within the Varig
factors and the discretionary function exception bars
claims based thereon. .Id. (emphasis added). In the
instant case, the state legislature has left to the
Division of Corrections "the manner in which, and the
extent to which, it will protect individuals and their
property from exposure to hazardous" inmates, halfway
house residents or parolees. Such discretion and the
implementation thereof, have the nature and quality of
activities the legislature intended to protect and
constitute government regulation of the conduct of private
individuals in its strictest sense.
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vessels.

Plaintiffs brought wrongful death actions against the

government, claiming that the National Weather Service was
negligent "in not earlier predicting the storm's true path,"
and the District Court awarded damages,

790 F.2d at 200.

The

First Circuit Court reversed, and, in so doing, expertly
pointed out that the pre-Varig discretionary function analysis
"would make the discretionary exception self-destructive."

Id.

at 203.
The Brown Court reviewed a Second Circuit case which the
District Court in Brown had relied on, Eklof Marine Corp. v.
United States, 762 F.2d 200 (2nd Cir. 1985), which held that
even though the Coast Guard had no duty to mark a dangerous
location at sea, once they decided to mark that danger and set
a buoy there, they thereby accepted a duty and were thus
obligated to perform that duty fully, "even, if necessary, to
the point of setting two or three buoys."
202.

Brown, 790 F.2d at

The First Circuit then explained the errors in the Eklof

reasoning (which similarly apply to Doe v. Arguelles):
[T]he court failed to consider the pernicious consequences that could flow from its approach. With
necessarily limited funds, and unable to afford three
buoys, will a Coast Guard official place one and risk
heavy damages ($382,000 in Eklof), or place none at
all and play it safe—from the government's standpoint? Eklof cuts to the heart of governmental
discretion, and, in effect, could deprive navigators
of half a loaf, usually thought better than none.
Id.

Is not the state corrections system faced with a similar

dilemma?

Limited funds and limited personnel versus an ever
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expanding prison population means that corrections may only be
capable of providing "half a loaf" of post-prison supervision
programs designed to facilitate assimilation into the community.
The principle involved here is not limited to the failure
to maintain preventive monitoring of a particular prisoner, but
is universal, and could apply to anything a court might find
impairs the success of rehabilitation programs.

An expert

might testify, and a court accept, that maintaining adequate
post-prison programs would call for still additional programs,
or for more advanced monitoring techniques, or for more personnel, acl infinitum.

A court might even find misfeasance in

the paperwork associated with the prisoner's processing.

See

Brown, 790 F.2d at 203.
All of these are matters which Congress [or the state
legislature] reserved, both to itself with respect to
appropriations, and to agencies' conduct, by the
discretionary function exception from the F.T.C.A.'s
[or the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's] consent to
suit. . . . Without question, a weather service [or a
corrections system] constitutes such, and to say that
the very exercise of the function justifies reliance
and a right to expect complete care would make the
discretionary exception self-destructive.
Id.
Finally, the Brown court expressed the basic inquiry called
for by Varig, and similar language permeates this Court's
decisions in Epting, Emery and Sheffield:
We add that, from the standpoint of the government,
the Weather Service [or corrections] is a particularly
unfortunate area in which to establish a duty of judicially reviewable due care. A weather forecast [or
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predicting criminal behavior] is a classic example of
a prediction of indeterminate reliability, and a place
peculiarly open to debatable decisions, including the
desirable degree of investment of government funds and
other resources. Weather predictions [and rehabilitation of criminals] fail on frequent occasions. If in
only a small proportion parties suffering in consequence succeeded in producing an expert who could
persuade a judge [or jury] that the government should
have done better, the burden on the fisc would be both
unlimited and intolerable. . . . [A]s the court said
in Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. at 2768[:] "Judicial
intervention in such decision-making through private
tort suits would require the courts to 'second-guess'
the political, social, and economic judgments of an
agency exercising its regulatory function. It was
precisely this sort of judicial intervention in
policy-making that the discretionary function exception was designed to prevent."
790 F.2d at 204.
The Brown court saw through the artificial semantics of the
pre-Varig interpretation of discretionary function, and the
decision would serve well as a model for this Court to follow
in the instant case.

Failing to follow the lead of Brown and

the other post-Varig federal cases will result in this Court
reading "the discretionary function exception right out by
finding it does not apply at precisely the place to which it is
particularly directed."

Brown, 790 F.2d at 202.

The primary significance of the post-Varig federal cases is
that the courts now apply the discretionary function exception
to bar claims for damages allegedly caused by lower level
government employees who exercised judgment and implemented
policy.

The federal courts are now using the two tests from

Varig, or the express language of Dalehite, and have discarded
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the planning level-operational level approach of pre-Varig
federal case law.

The current federal case law interpreting

the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims
Act now bears no resemblance to that relied upon by this Court
in Frank v. State, Little v. Utah State Div. of Fam. Serv., or
in Doe v. Arguelles.
4.

Doe v. Arguelles Is Inconsistent with Federal
Case Law Interpretation of the Discretionary
Function Exception.

Appellant relies on Doe v. Arguelles,1l for the proposition that the discretionary function exception does not apply
here and that there is no immunity.

This Court's holding in

Arguelles, however, is not nearly as broad as appellant
claims.

In Arguelles, this Court declared:

It is widely held that the decision to release,
parole, or put on probation criminal defendants,

i i

The facts of Doe v. Arguelles are as follows:
Arguelles was a juvenile placed in the State Youth
Development Center (the "YDC") with a history of sexual
violence. On December 19, 1979, Arguelles was released
from the YDC into the community. His release was approved
by YDC Director Ronald Stromberg. On March 6, 1980,
Arguelles assaulted the 14-year-old ward of plaintiff.
Stromberg's decision to release Arguelles was based, at
least in part, on the fact that certain conditions and
requirements were attached to the release, e.g., weekly
meetings between Arguelles and a counselor. Thus,
Stromberg not only made the decisions to release and to
place conditions on the release, but also, according to
the Court's conclusions, personally was responsible for
implementing and monitoring the release and the conditions
of release.
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juvenile defendants, or mental patients is a decision
of a judgment, planning, or policy nature. . . . It
accordingly follows that Stromberg's decision to place
Arguelles fell into the category of functions designed
to be shielded under the discretionary function exception, and his decision should not be questioned in a
court of law.
25 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11.
According to Arguelles, then, appellant here has no claim
based on any alleged negligence relating to the decision to
transfer Kenneth Roberts from the state prison to the Ogden
halfway house.

According to Arguelles, the only actionable

activities would be those occurring after the transfer, where,
allegedly, corrections officials negligently supervised
Roberts.

See id. at 12. Thus, according to Arguelles, the

discretionary function exception bars any claim against
respondent William Milliken, who, as Director of the Division
of Corrections, may have been indirectly involved with the
decision to transfer, but who, according to the undisputed
facts, had absolutely no involvement in the supervision of
Roberts after his transfer.

Likewise, appellant has no claim

against respondent Leon Hatch, who, as Deputy Warden, was
directly involved in the decision to transfer Roberts to the
halfway house but was not involved in any way with the
supervision of Roberts after he arrived at the halfway house.
Arguelles restricts the issues here to only the acts or
failure to act of respondent Weldon Morgan, the Director of the
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Ogden halfway house, who was responsible for supervising
Roberts.

All other acts of which appellant complains deal

directly and intimately with the decision to transfer Roberts
and are protected by the holding in Arguelles.

If Arguelles

stands for anything it stands for the proposition that a decision to release or transfer a prison inmate is discretionary.
The dilemma this Court must resolve, then, is the striking
inconsistency which has developed between the federal case law
interpretation of the discretionary function exception after
Varig and this Court's interpretation of the exception in Doe
v. Arguelles, particularly as that exception applies to those
decisions and actions of respondent Weldon Morgan occurring
after Roberts was transferred to the Ogden halfway house.
Frank v. State, supra, acknowledged that federal case law
interpreting the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)) was the standard
followed by the Utah Court in cases previous to Frank:
In this regard, this Court has followed the lead of
cases interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act by
distinguishing between those decisions occurring at a
broad, policy-making level and those taking place at
the implementing "operational" level.
612 P.2d at 519.

Citing Carroll v. State Road Comm'n as an

example of the Court's adoption of the planning level-operational level approach of the federal courts, the Court used
that approach to decide the issues in Frank.

-59-

See also Bigelow

v. Inqersoll, 618 P.2d at 53-54.

This well-established

precedent was re-emphasized in Little v. Utah State Div. of
Farm Serv., supra, where Justice Howe observed:
Utah's exceptions to waiver of governmental immunity
closely parallel those enumerated under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act. This Court
has followed the lead of cases interpreting that act.
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). Beginning
with the two root cases of Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 61, 73, S. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953) and
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76
S. Ct. 122, 100 L. Ed. 48 (1955), the lines in federal
cases have been consistently drawn between those functions ascribable to policy making level and those to
the operational level.
667 P.2d at 51.
This Court reached the logical, albeit radical, ultimate
extension of the planning level-operational level approach to
application of the discretionary function exception in Doe v.
Arguelles.

There, the Court held:

Because a probation officer's policy decisions are
discretionary, he is immune from suit arising from
those decisions. However, his acts implementing the
policy must be considered on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether they are ministerial and thereby
outside the immunity protections . . .
. . . If it can be shown at trial that the
injury to plaintiff's ward was proximately caused by
Stromberg's omissions, it . . . result[ed] from . . .
his negligence in monitoring the prescribed treatment
after making the discretionary decision to do so.
25 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12 (emphasis added).
Arguelles thus grants discretionary immunity to decisions
made at the policy making or planning level, but denies
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immunity to acts implementing those very same decisions—even
though in Arguelles it was the same person who made the decision and then acted to implement it. Arguelles has effectively
written the discretionary function exception right out of the
Governmental Immunity Act, which is exactly where the planning
level-operational level dichotomy approach ultimately leads.
No decision or policy, left alone, ever caused any damage
or injury, or, for that matter, any real benefit.

It is only

through actual implementation that a decision or policy can
further legitimate governmental goals or sometimes, unfortunately, cause harm.

By declaring that the thought processes

used in making a decision are discretionary, but that acts
implementing that decision are not, Arguelles destroys the
protection intended by the discretionary function exception.
All a plaintiff need do is allege negligent implementation of a
policy decision - for, obviously, if plaintiff was injured,
then there must have been an act or omission, and thus "implementation"—and no such claim can ever again be barred.
Arguelles may even eliminate discretionary protection of a
non-implemented decision.

The negligent implementation of a

decision would, of course, include failure to implement where
implementation should have occurred.

Even though a govern-

mental official may decide upon a policy, but decide not to
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implement it, perhaps in part to avoid the liability that could
attach under Arguelles, he nevertheless subjects himself to
liability by not acting where possibly he should have acted.
In any event, according to Arguelles, his failure to implement
becomes an issue of fact.

In the classic "Catch-22," the

official becomes liable if he acts or if he doesn't act.
It is here that the inherent fundamental flaws of the planning level-operational level approach become most evident.

It

will not take long for government officials to learn that if
liability attaches both for implementing decisions and for not
implementing decisions, it is the decision itself that triggers
liability.

The ultimate extension of the pre-Varig approach to

discretionary function then, as evidenced by Arguelles, makes
the decision-making process the source of "case-by-case" consideration to determine whether there is negligence.

The plan-

ning level-operational level approach in Arguelles thus
effectively eliminates application of the Governmental Immunity
Act's discretionary function exception.12
It is for these reasons that, just as post-Varig federal
courts have re-evaluated their pre-Varig decisions, this Court

Thus, the Arguelles Court "judicially admit[ted] at
the back door that which has been legislatively turned
away at the front door," Bradley v. United States, 615
F. Supp. 206, 211 (E.D. Pa. 1985), and, by judicial fiat,
amended the governmental Immunity Act by effectively
deleting Section 63-30-10(1)(a) .
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needs to re-evaluate Arguelles.

By doing so, this Court will

come to apply the Varig test to the undisputed facts of this
case, determine that the actions of the corrections officials
involved in this case are protected by the discretionary
function exception, reaffirm Epting (just as Varig reaffirmed
Dalehite), and ensure that the Governmental Immunity Act's
discretionary function exception be given its intended effect.
To do otherwise would reguire this Court to do one or more
of the following:

(a) expressly overrule Epting, Emery and

Sheffield; (b) repudiate the Court's decade-long adherence to
the precedent of following the lead of federal case law interpretation of the discretionary function exception, and thereby
explicitly reverse portions of Frank and Little; (c) disregard
the unanimous United States Supreme Court opinion in Varig and
the subseguent case law development in the federal courts;
(d) intentionally preserve the same type of artificial and
conclusory dichotomy approach this Court earlier rejected in
Standiford and Johnson; and (e) by judicial fiat, write the
discretionary function exception out of the Governmental
Immunity Act by effectively eliminating any meaningful application of that exception.
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POINT II
BOTH THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND
COMMON LAW BAR APPELLANT'S CLAIMS FOR GROSS
NEGLIGENCE AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS .
A.

Representative Capacity.

Where a governmental entity is immune from suit, its
employees, acting in their representative capacities, are likewise immune from suit.

Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d at 632;

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3) and (4). As ruled by the District
Court below, and supported by the legal authorities set forth
at length above, appellant's claims against respondent State of
Utah are barred by governmental immunity.

According to the law

in Utah, as set forth unequivocally in statute and by this
Court in Madsen, appellant has no cause of action against
respondents William Milliken, Leon Hatch and Weldon Morgan in
their representative capacities as employees of the State of
Utah.

The District Court's summary judgment to that effect

must be affirmed.
B.

Personal Capacity.
1.

Common Law Is Applicable Here.
In 1978, the Utah Legislature amended Section

63-30-4 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by adding two
major paragraphs establishing the Act's express waivers of
immunity as the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by entity
employees while acting within the scope of their employment.
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See 1978 Utah Laws Ch. 27 § 3.

In the January 28, 1983 case of

Madsen v. Borthick, supra, this Court interpreted this 1978
amendment to be an expression of legislative intent to eliminate any and all common law remedies against government entities and employees not otherwise expressed within the Act.

See

658 P.2d at 633. The Court also held that the 1978 amendment
indicated legislative intent to substitute the statutory
immunity standards of the Act for any and all defenses that
might have been asserted under common law, including, but not
necessarily limited to, common law official immunity.

Id.

At the legislative session held within weeks of the release
of the Madsen opinion, the Utah Legislature added another subsection to Section 63-3C-4 of the Act.
129 § 3.

See 1983 Utah Laws Ch.

By that amendment, the Legislature clarified its

intent that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act generally, and
the 1978 amendments to Section 63-30-4 specifically, not be
interpreted to eliminate any defenses that might be asserted by
a government entity or employee under state or federal common
law.13

Id.

The 1983 amendment also re-emphasized what had been
clarified by the amendments in 1978 -- that the provisions
of the Act apply to government employees as well as their
entity employers. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(2). In
her brief, appellant cites three pre-1980 decisions of
this Court in support of her argument that the Act does
not apply to individuals. Such argument directly contradicts the 1978 and 1983 amendments, and is contrary to
Madsen v. Borthick, supra, and, therefore, should be
disregarded.
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This Court cannot ignore the clear expression of legislative intent in that 1983 amendment, passed immediately after
the Madsen decision.

The new subsection 63-30-4(2) did not

create any new law or affect any substantive or vested right.
It was no more than a clear message to the courts of this state
that the Legislature never intended the Governmental Immunity
Act to eliminate or otherwise affect adversely any defense that
an entity or its employee might assert under common law.

This

amendment is clearly consistent with the overall framework of
the Act, which codifies the common law of sovereign immunity as
the presumption in any suit for injury resulting from the
exercise of a governmental function.

The codification allows

an injured party to sue the government or its employee only
under the conditions and circumstances expressly enumerated.
In other words, immunity is the rule and remedies are the
exception.

The 1983 amendment adding subsection (2) to Section

63-30-4 merely clarified that subsections 63-30-4(3) and (4)
eliminate all common law remedies, substituting therefore the
exclusive remedies of the Act, but do not affect applicable
common law defenses.14

14

Thus, the Madsen analysis concluding that the Act
eliminates application of all common law, both defenses
and remedies, must be modified slightly. The Act eliminates only common law remedies; common law defenses may
still be asserted to eliminate causes of action or bar
recovery. With this modification, Madsen remains a
valuable development of governmental immunity law in Utah,
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According to Frank v. State, supra, where an amendment is
an "obvious manifestation" of legislative intent to clarify
interpretation of the statute it amends, the amendment should
be applied retroactively.
is obvious here.

613 P.2d at 519.

The manifestation

The Legislature amended the Act as soon as

possible after it perceived that this Court in Madsen had
interpreted the Act in a way inconsistent with the Legislature's original intent.
Frank is controlling here and subsection (2) of Section
63-30-4 applies to this case,15 and respondents may properly
assert any applicable common law defenses.
2.

Common Law Official Immunity Bars Appellant's
Claims Against Respondents In Their Personal
Capacities.

Prior to Madsen v. Borthick, this Court recognized and
applied the common law defense of official immunity.

As stated

by Justice Crockett in Sheffield v. Turner, supra, and in
Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d at 928 (Crockett, J., concurring),
and reiterated in Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d
715, 721 (Utah 1982), official immunity barred any action

In Doe v. Arguelles, 25 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12, this
Court erroneously stated that subsection (2) of Section
63-30-4 was added by amendment in 1978. As noted herein,
subsection (2) was added in 1983. Compare 1983 Utah Laws
Ch. 129 § 3 with 1978 Utah Laws Ch. 27 § 3. Nevertheless,
pursuant to Frank v. State, this Court properly applied
the 1983 amendment retroactively to the pre-1983 facts in
Arguelles.
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against a governmental officer or employee for injury allegedly
resulting from that employee's good faith execution of his
legally authorized discretionary duties insofar as the employee
was not guilty of any intentional or willful wrongdoing.
As recently as October of 1984, this Court cited favorably
to Sutro, and held that, with respect to common law official
immunity, "[a] discretionary duty is one that requires the
exercise of judgment or requires choice of alternatives in its
performance."

Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah 1984).

This 1984 definition of discretionary performance for purposes
of common law official immunity reiterates the position adopted
by this Court in Sheffield and Sutro.* 6
The District Court below properly held that the State of
Utah was immune from suit by virtue of the discretionary

Not until Doe v. Arguelles was decided in December of
1985, did this Court apply the planning level-operational
level approach to common law official immunity. Prior to
Arguelles, this Court applied at least two distinct standards for discretionary acts of government officials: (1)
the planning level-operational level approach of Frank,
Bigelow, et al., for application of the statutory discretionary function waiver of the Act; and (2) the exercise
of judgment/alternate choices analysis of Sheffield, Sutro
and Snyder, for application in common law official immunity cases. Without acknowledging the separate theories,
Arguelles commingled the two and seems to have eliminated
the Sheffield/Sutro/Snyder common law analysis without
comment.
(continued)
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function exception to the waiver of immunity; the discretionary
acts which formed the basis of the lower court's decision were
undertaken by none other than respondents Milliken, Hatch and
Morgan.

If the State is immune by virtue of the discretionary

function exception, then, as a matter of law, the acts of these
respondents were discretionary, requiring "the exercise of
judgment" and the "choice of alternatives" in the performance
of those acts.

Snyder, 693 P.2d at 65. This Court in

Sheffield succinctly stated the dispositive legal principle
applicable here:
[T]he warden and other prison officers are protected
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity against claims
of negligence so long as they are acting in good faith
and within the scope of their duties . . . [. T]hey
could not be held liable unless they were guilty of
some conduct which transcended the bounds of good
faith performance of their duty by a willful or malicious wrongful act which they know or should know
would result in injury.
Sheffield, 445 P.2d at 369 (footnote omitted).

(Continued)
Elsewhere in this brief, respondents set forth in
detail the misapplication of the statutory discretionary
function in Arquelles. The recent developments in the
federal courts following Varig suggests that the two distinct approaches used by this Court prior to Arguelles can
be harmonized, but the harmony must come from adoption by
this Court of the Dalehite/Varig Airlines analysis, rather
than a perpetuation of Arguelles.
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The Court in Epting reviewed in detail the balancing of
interests and the exercise of judgment that go hand-in-hand
with the administration of penal institutions and the attempted
rehabilitation of adjudicated criminals.
244.

Epting, 546 P.2d at

Numerous courts from other jurisdictions have discussed

the inherent risks involved in corrections policies and programs, and how corrections officials daily are faced with making decisions and implementing programs that inherently require
allocation of those risks.

See Thompson v. County of Alameda,

27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980); Caril
v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982); Adamov v. State, 46 Ohio
Misc. 1, 345 N.E.2d 661 (Ohio Ct. CI. 1975); Evangelical United
Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440
(1965).
The common law defense of official immunity, as defined by
this Court in Sheffield, Sutro and Snyder attaches to the
discretionary acts of respondents Milliken, Hatch and Morgan,
and bars appellant's claims against them in their individual
capacities.

There is no evidence of willful or intentional

wrongdoing which would preclude application of this common law
immunity, and the District Court's ruling with respect to the
personal liability of the individual respondents was error.
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3.

The Governmental Immunity Act Bars Appellant's
Claims Against Respondents In Their Personal
Capacities.

In 1983, the Utah Legislature amended Section 63-30-4 of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by adding subsection (2), as
discussed in detail above, and by deleting the term "gross
negligence" from subsections (3) and (4). The District Court's
ruling below, which denied summary judgment on the issue of the
individual state respondents' alleged gross negligence, was
based on the inclusion of "gross negligence" in the exclusive
statutory remedy of subsections (3) and (4). See Memorandum
Decision at 18-19, Record on Appeal at 900-901; copy of Memorandum Decision attached hereto as Appendix "B." As a matter
of law, either (a) appellant's cause of action against respondents did not accrue until after the effective date of the
deletion of "gross negligence" from the Act by amendment, or
(b) the amendment should be applied retroactively to implement
an obvious manifestation of legislative intent to clarify the
Act's application and interpretation.

In either case, based on

Section 63-30-4 of the Act, appellant has no cause of action
against respondents Milliken, Hatch and Morgan for gross
negligence.
(a) Appellant's Cause of Action Did Not Accrue
Until After the Effective Date of the 1983
Amendment Deleting Gross Negligence.
As discussed in detail above, subsection (3) and (4) of
Section 63-30-4 sets forth the exclusivity of the remedies
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available to an injured party wishing to sue a government
entity or its employees.

The remedy is statutory; it did not

exist at common law, which barred all claims against the
sovereign and its sovereign agents.
Borthick, 658 P.2d at 629.
a creation of statute.

See generally Madsen v.

Appellant's cause of action thus is

The conditions set forth in the statute

limiting or circumscribing the remedies available to appellant
are conditions precedent which must be satisfied before the
action can be maintained in a court of law.

Cornwall v.

Larsen, 571 P.2d at 926; Madsen v. Borthick, supra.
The Governmental Immunity Act requires that before an
injured party can seek a remedy in the courts (for injury
arising out of the exercise of a governmental function), the
injured party must file a notice of claim with the entity and
wait until that claim is expressly denied or ninety (90) days
expires from the the time notice was given, whichever occurs
first.

The injured party has no cause of action in court to

remedy his injury until these notice conditions are satisfied.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 through -15.
It is the law in Utah that a cause of action "accrues at
the time it becomes remedial in the courts, that is when the
claim is in such condition that the courts can proceed and give
judgment if the claim is established."

State Tax Comm'n v.

Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 100 P.2d 575, 577 (1940).
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In the

case at bar, according to Utah law, appellant's claim against
respondents did not accrue until it could be remedied "in the
courts."

Id.

Appellant was assaulted by Kenneth Roberts on December 24,
1982.

She filed two notices of claim with the State of Utah.

The first was filed on January 11, 1983, but did not name any
of the individual respondents, and was a civil rights claim for
deprivation of rights, representing to the State that a civil
rights action would be filed in federal court.

See Notice of

Intent to Sue and Claim, Record on Appeal at 869-70, copy
attached hereto as Appendix "C." Appellant then filed an
Amended Notice of Claim on March 8, 1983, naming respondent
William Milliken and several "John Does," in addition to
respondent State of Utah.

This second notice of claim put the

state and respondent Milliken on notice that appellant was
claiming negligence and gross negligence, and would be suing in
state court if the claim were denied.

See Amended Notice of

Claim and Intent to Sue, Record on Appeal at 872, copy attached
hereto as Appendix "D." The second notice filed on March 8
triggered the ninety (90) day statutory waiting period.

The

State did not expressly deny appellant's claim, so appellant
could file an action in the District Court no sooner than
June 8, 1983, ninety (90) days after she had filed her notice
of claim.

Until that date in June, appellant had no right to
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any remedy in any court in the State. 17

Thus, her cause of

action against the State and its employees did not accrue until
June 8, 1983.
It is also the general rule in Utah that "the facts and the
law in a given lawsuit are to be applied as of the date of the
filing of the original complaint."

Archer v. Utah State Land

Bd., 15 Utah 2d 321, 392 P.2d 622, 624 (1964).

Appellant's

original complaint was not filed until December 6, 1983, see
Appellant's Complaint, Record on Appeal, at 17, but in any
event could not have been filed before June 8, 1983,
ninety (90) days after she filed her notice of claim.
The amendments to Section 63-30-4 became effective law as
of May 10, 1983.

See 1983 Utah Laws Ch. 129.

The effective

date of the amendment deleting gross negligence from the
statute thus occurred well before the accrual of appellant's

The Governmental Immunity Act precludes application of
regular tort law principles for accrual of causes of
action. On December 24, 1982, appellant could have filed
an action against Roberts for the assault, and regular
tort principles would apply to such a suit. But where
appellant seeks a remedy against the State and its
employees, she could not find a remedy in the courts on
December 24, 1982. The Legislature, by passage of the
Governmental Immunity Act, created the remedy sought by
appellant and circumscribed its availability. "[T]he
general rule is that the Legislature may attach its own
conditions to an exercise of the rights granted [by
statute]." Montgomery v. Polk County, 278 N.W.2d 911, 915
(Iowa 1979).
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cause of action on June 8, 1983. Thus, as of the time appellant could seek remedy from the courts, her remedy against the
individual respondents in their personal capacities was limited
to fraud or malice only.

She therefore has no cause of action

for gross negligence, and there being no claim of fraud or
malice, nor any evidence to support same, her Amended Complaint
should be dismissed.
(b) The 1983 Amendment Deleting Gross Negligence
Should Be Applied Retroactively.
As explained above, the legislature amended Section 63-30-4
of the Act within weeks of this Court's interpretation of that
section in Madsen v. Borthick.

The amendments did two things:

(1) consistent with a portion of the Madsen opinion, the
amendments clarified legislative intent that the Act displaced
common law remedies, but made it clear that the Act was
intended to preserve all applicable common law defenses; and
(2) consistent with the common law defense of official immunity, which the Legislature manifestly intended to preserve,
the Legislature deleted the term "gross negligence" from the
statute, leaving fraud and malice —
tional wrongs —

both willful and inten-

as the exclusive remedies against a government

employee in his personal capacity.
The elimination of "gross negligence" conformed the statute
to Utah case law authority defining common law official immunity.

See Cornwall v. Larsen, supra, and Utah State Univ. v.
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Sutro & Co., supra.
quick and clear.

The legislative response to Madsen was

The Court not only had interpreted the

statute's exclusive remedy provisions differently than the
Legislature had originally intended, but also eliminated common
law official immunity, which the Legislature had intended to
preserve.

According to Frank v. State, supra, an amendment of

this kind should be applied retroactively by the courts in
order to implement the clear legislative manifestation of
intent.
The District Court below rejected this argument, ruling
that retroactive application would divest appellant of a vested
right to a cause of action for gross negligence.
dum Decision, supra, at 22.

See Memoran-

In doing so, the District Court

erroneously applied regular tort law principles affecting
accrual of causes of action to a statutorily created remedy
circumscribed by express statutory conditions.

That statutory

scheme creates a cause of action not affected by regular tort
principles of accrual.

The lower court ruled that since appel-

lant was injured on December 24, 1982, the law in effect on
December 24, 1982 was the law of the case.

Obviously, if

appellant were suing a private individual or corporation, she
might have filed a complaint on the day she was injured and the
District Court's conclusion would then be correct.
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Appellant's

desire to seek remedy from a government entity and its
employees, however, involves different rules of accrual.
The Utah Supreme Court has not addressed vested rights in
connection with actions against a governmental entity or its
employees.

Numerous states have, however, and the vast major-

ity hold that the vested right analysis is inappropriate where
the right to sue is granted only by consent of the government
under specific statutory conditions.
The California Court of Appeal has declared:
[I]t is clear that the scheme for suing the government
in California is based upon waiver of immunity from
legal action. This scheme was not designed to create
an independent source of substantive liability. . . .
Moreover, the constitutional authority empowering the
Legislature to control the manner in which the government is sued . . ., has been construed as a consent tc
be sued, not an independent basis on which to hold the
government liable. . . . In short, since a government
entity in California may be sued only by virtue of
consent, the vested right analysis . . . is manifestly
inappropriate.
Stanley v. City and County of San Francisco, 48 Cal. App. 2d
575, 121 Cal. Rptr. 842, 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (emphasis
added).

The Superior Court of New Jersey likewise held that

the vested right "formulation" is
a misconception of the effect of the [governmental
tort immunity] statute. It does not bar a cause of
action; its effect, rather is to prevent what might
otherwise be a cause of action, from ever
arising. . . . The injured party literally has no
cause of action.
Perillo v. Dreher, 126 N.J. Super. 264, 314 A.2d 74, 77 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1974) (emphasis in original).
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Similar rulings have been made by the Supreme Courts of
Kansas, Woodring v. Hall, 200 Kan, 597, 438 P.2d 135, 142
(1968) ("It is the law of this state that a statute which
merely changes a remedy is not invalid, as there are no vested
rights in any particular remedy."), Colorado, Jefferson County
Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. D.A.G., 199 Colo. 315, 607 P.2d 1004,
1006 (1980) (no such thing as a vested right in remedies), and
Washington, Hansen v. West Coast Wholesale Drug Co., 47 Wash.
2d 825, 289 P.2d 718, 720 (1955) ("Where a tort action can be
brought only by virtue of a statute, there can be no vested
right therein, and the Legislature may take away the right at
any time."

(emphasis in original)).

See also Fussner v.

Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961); White v. State,
661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434,
297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 245 N.E.2d 192 (1969).
Thus, the District Court's ruling below in the instant
case, that appellant had a vested right as of December 24, 1982
in a cause of action for gross negligence against the state
employees in their individual capacities, is contrary to law.
No such vested right existed.

Accordingly, retroactive appli-

cation of the 1983 amendment eliminating gross negligence will
not enlarge, eliminate or destroy any vested right, and is,
therefore, appropriate.

See generally Pilcher v. State Dept.

-78-

of Soc. Serv., 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983); State Dept. of
Soc. Serv. v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982).
POINT III
APPELLANT HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SIMPLE
NEGLIGENCE AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS MILLIKEN, HATCH AND MORGAN.
By interlocutory appeal, appellant challenges the District
Court's holding that she cannot sue the individual respondents
in their non-representative, individual capacities for simple
negligence.

The District Court's ruling, however, is consis-

tent with Doe v. Arguelles, which restated well-established
law:

"the legislature has mandated . . . that no employee may

be held liable unless it is established that his act or
omission constituted gross negligence."

Id., at 12 (footnote

omitted).
The Governmental Immunity Act section referred to by the
Arguelles Court (Section 63-30-4) establishes the provisions of
the Act as the exclusive remedy against a governmental entity
or employee for any injury allegedly caused by the exercise of
a governmental function.

Only where the Act does not apply can

a plaintiff bring a cause of action other than those specifically enumerated within the Act.

Neither Section 63-30-4, nor

any other section of the Act provides a remedy against a

-79-

governmental employee for injury caused by the simple negligence of that employee.18
Appellant's argument that the Act's insurance provisions in
some fashion require personal liability of employees for simple
negligence ignores not only the entire concept of the Act but
specific provisions thereof as well.

The argument is little

more than a non-sequitor.
Appellant also relies on Madsen v. Borthick, supra, as
support foe the argument that simple negligence is actionable,
even though she concedes that the Madsen facts are "unlike" the
facts of this case.

See Brief of Appellant, at 79. Appellant

purposefully avoids the Court's holding in Madsen, opting
instead to refer this Court to passages from one of the briefs
filed in the Madsen case.

If, as appellant asserts, the Madsen

holding is not applicable, then arguments asserted by one of
the Madsen parties in an appeal brief certainly do not apply
here and need not be considered.
The applicable statute (Section 63-30-4) is unambiguous and
clear.

The holding in Madsen, 658 P.2d at 632-33, reaffirmed

Appellant does not here challenge application of the
Act. The actions complained of are governmental functions
and, pursuant to Section 63-30-3 of the Act, the provisions of the Act apply.
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by Arguelles, is no less clear.

As a matter of law, appellant

has no cause of action for simple negligence against any of the
individual respondents.
POINT IV
THE MAXIM OF DELEGATUS NON POTEST DELEGARE
IS NOT APPLICABLE HERE.
Appellant argues that the Prison Warden, Kenneth Shulsen,
had a non-delegable statutory duty to authorize personally the
transfer of Kenneth Roberts from the prison to the Ogden
halfway house facility, and that his failure to be personally
involved is an actionable breach of that duty.

Appellant bases

this argument on an ancient Latin maxim, delegatus non potest
delegare, which, as a generality, states that delegated power
may not be delegated further by the delegatee to whom such
power is delegated.

See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution

Control Bd., 25 111. App. 3d 271, 323 N.E.2d 84 (111. Ct. App.
1975).

Citing Section 64-13-11 which provides that

M

[t]he

warden may transfer any inmate from one correctional facility
or custody level to another," and arguing application of the
Latin maxim, appellant contends that the warden must be
personally involved in each and every internal prison transfer or custody level change involving each of the more than
1,900 inmates at the prison.
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Ignoring the most obvious flaw in this argument, that
appellant has never made claim against the warden, the argument
fails for several reasons.

First, the Utah Code provisions

dealing with interpretation and construction of statutory
language specifically declare:
"Sheriff," "county attorney," "clerk," or other
words used to denote an executive or ministerial
officer, may include any deputy, or other person
performing the duties of such officers, either
generally or in special cases. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(17) (emphasis added).

See also id.

§ 68-3-2 (statutes in derogation of common law to be liberally
construed).

By statutory provision, the use of the term

"warden" in Section 64-13-11 may include "any deputy, or other
person performing the duties" of the warden.
Simply put, the statute relied upon by appellant (Section
64-13-11), interpreted liberally in light of Sections 68-3-2
and 68-3-12(17), does not restrict the warden's powers as
appellant suggests.

Rather, where a deputy warden,19 acting

on behalf of the warden and with his knowledge and consent,
implements a statutorily authorized intra-system transfer of an

19

In this instance, the Deputy Warden was respondent
Leon Hatch. As Chairman of the Prison Administrative
Review Board, Hatch made the final decision approving
Kenneth Roberts* classification change and transfer to the
Ogden halfway house. Warden Kenneth Shulsen had delegated
that assignment to Hatch, making him responsible for the
management of all housing and custody programs. See
Deposition of Kenneth Shulsen, at 6-11.
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inmate, he does so as the alter-ego of the warden, and the
transfer is valid and lawful.

See State v. Aherns, 25 Utah 2d

222, 479 P.2d 786, 787 (1971).

See also Poucher v. State, 46

Ala. App. 272, 240 So.2d 694 (Ala. Crim. App. 1970).
Secondly, such transfer, whether accomplished by the
warden or his deputy, is just as appellant describes it in her
brief -- an exercise of discretion and quasi-judicial in character.

See Brief of Appellant, at 69. While appellant tries

to limit this discretion to the decision to transfer, thus
eliminating discretion from the actual implementation of the
transfer (as per Arguelles), appellant ignores the very
language of the statute upon which she relies, which says "the
warden may transfer," and not "the warden may only decide to
transfer."
The term "may transfer" as used here, is obviously intended
as discretionary, not mandatory, see Purcell v. Wilkins, 57 Utah
467, 195 P. 547 (1921), and the discretion intended by the
Legislature clearly deals expressly with the actual transfer.
The statute does not limit the discretion only to the decision
to transfer, or to the decision-making procedure which may
ultimately lead to transfer, nor does the statute exclude the
implementation of the transfer.

Rather, discretion attaches to

the actual implementation of the transfer, as well as to the
policy-level decisions preceding the transfer.
Where the Legislature expressly states that the warden (or
his deputy) "may transfer any inmate," this Court cannot
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justifiably interpret that clear grant of discretionary authority in any way other than what it says.

There is no rational

way, under any recognized principle of statutory construction,
for this Court to interpret "may transfer" to mean:

"discre-

tion to decide to transfer, but once the decision is made to
transfer, there is no discretion to implement that decision or
to actually transfer the inmate."
Last, but not least, the maxim which appellant wishes to
apply here is simply impractical and inappropriate in modern
day society.

A strict application of the maxim would bring the

operation of government to a grinding halt.

Clearly, the

administrative aspects of running an overcrowded prison,
including the coordination of corrections programs, overseeing
inmates, and supervising hundreds of employees, simply do not
conform to ancient Latin maxims.20

Numerous appellate courts have considered this maxim
and found that it either has lost its force as a result of
the impact of management problems in complex business and
government operations, Adams v. Clearance Corp., 35 Del.
Ch. 318, 116 A.2d 893 (1955), or that the legal principle
espoused must be adapted to and its application restricted
by the present-day concepts of government, City of Bayonne
v. Palmer, 90 N.J. Super. 245, 217 A.2d 141 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1966). See also Warren County v. Judges of
the Fifth Judicial Dist., 243 N.W.2d 894 (Iowa 1976)
(recognizing "modern tendency toward greater liberality"
in application "as the complexity of governmental and
economic conditions increase"); Ruggeri v. City of St.
Louis, 441 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. 1969) (recognizing Mtliberal
trend1 or even inapplicability of the doctrine").
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POINT V
AS A MATTER OF LAW, RESPONDENTS OWED NO DUTY
TO APPELLANT.
The argument hereinabove set forth renders the issue of
legal duty moot.

Nevertheless, because the Court below ruled

that a legal, actionable duty extended from the State respondents to appellant, the issue will be addressed briefly here to
show the Court's error.
In order for appellant to recover against these respondents
she must show that she had a special relationship with these
respondents which would impose a duty greater than the general
duty owed by respondents to the public at large.

The United

States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered factual circumstances similar to this case in Humann v. Wilson,
696 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1983), and recognized that the
plaintiff there "did not stand in any special relationship to
the parolee from which the parole officers might have inferred
a special danger to her."

Id., at 784. This requirement that a

"special relationship" exist between plaintiff and defendant
before an actionable duty arises is an expression of the
"public duty" rule.

This rule requires that appellant "must

show the breach of a duty owed to [her] as an individual, and
not merely the breach of an obligation owed to the general
public."

18 McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations,

§ 53.046 at 165 (3rd Ed. 1971).
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The "public duty" rule is the law in Utah.

In Obray v.

Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160 (1971), the Cache County
Sheriff was sued for alleged failure to investigate a burglary
of plaintiffs store.

This Court declared that the failure, if

any, of the sheriff to investigate was "ordinarily . . . . a
matter of judgment and discretion, not actionable or compensable, and not pursuable by an individual since the public
official's duty is to the public."
omitted).

484 P.2d at 162 (footnotes

Clearly, the same, if not greater, judgment and

discretion are exercised by corrections officials making and
implementing corrections decisions.

Accordingly, the Obray

public duty rule applies here.
In Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984), this
Court reached this same conclusion.

There, plaintiff's dece-

dent was killed when he failed to negotiate a corner on his
motorcycle.

Moments earlier he had been stopped by sheriff's

deputies who had reason to believe that the decedent was
intoxicated but nevertheless only requested that the decedent
walk his motorcycle home.

Plaintiff suggested that the Utah

Supreme Court adopt "a trend to the effect that 'public
employees should be held liable for their tortious acts to the
same extent as private persons.'"

Ld. at 612-13.

The Court

refused, saying that to do so "would be to legislate by judicial fiat."

Id., at 613.

Instead, the Court concluded that the

duty of a police officer is a duty "owed to the public at
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large."

Id.. , quoting Stout v. City of Porterville, 148 Cal.

App. 3d 937, 196 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1983).
This general duty owed to the public at large may become a
special duty owed to an individual, and thus one which is
actionable by that individual, but only in circumstances where
the government deals or acts directly with the injured party on
an individual basis.
therein.

See 18 McQuillan, supra, and cases cited

Such were the facts in Little v. Utah State Div. of

Family Serv., supra.

There, the Division of Family Services

placed the child in a foster home, assumed a specific duty to
provide proper care for the child, and then breached that
specific duty.

That is not the case here.

No such direct

contact took place between appellant and respondents; no
special relationship was created, and no specific duty towards
appellant was assumed.

Even when the state assumes voluntarily

to perform certain acts or functions, either by statute,
regulation, or otherwise, no liability or actionable duty is
created absent a special relationship with claimant.21

2 1

The public duty doctrine is also the rule in a majority of jurisdictions across the country. See Dinsky v.
Town of Framingham, 386 Mass. 810, 438 N.E.2d 51, 56
(1982) (application of majority rule that in absence of
special duty to plaintiff, different from duty owed to
public at large, no cause of action can be maintained
against a government entity), and cases cited therein; J &
B Development Co., Inc. v. King County, 669 P.2d 468, 472
(Wash. 1983) (it is necessary to decide whether there is a
(continued)
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See generally, Thompson v. United States, 592 F.2d 1104,
1109-10 (9th Cir. 1979); Christenson v. Hayward, supra; White
v. State, 579 P.2d 921, 923 (Utah 1978).
The District Court below erroneously adopted the duty analysis expressed in the Arizona case of Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of
Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227 (Ariz. 1977) (which held that
individual members of the Board of Pardons could be held liable
for their decisions regarding parole of prison inmates), and
decisions from Montana, Hawaii, Colorado and Kansas.
randum Decision, supra, at 25-26.

See Memo-

The District Court, however,

failed to take into account that each of these jurisdictions
refuses to recognize governmental immunity, and, accordingly,
the basic premises and concepts upon which duty is formulated
there are entirely inconsistent with that prevailing here in
Utah.

See generally State v. Anderton, 69 Utah 53, 252 P. 280

(1926) (decisions of courts of other states under statutes
differing from those of Utah are not controlling).

In effect,

the District Court ignored the Governmental Immunity Act

(Continued)
general duty to a nebulous public or whether that duty has
focused on this particular claimant); Davidson v. City of
Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 899, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 252 (1982) (the common theme running through cases
in which a special relationship has been found is the
voluntary assumption by the public entity or official of a
specific duty toward the injured party).
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and the basic presumptions it created and perpetuates, which
presumptions are expressed in the decisions of Obray and
Christenson, and judicially legislated into existence a new law
respecting governmental duty.
The District Court attempts to justify this creation of new
Utah law by declaring that because the Legislature, in Section
63-30-4, allowed causes of action against individual government
employees for gross negligence, fraud or malice, somehow that
shows legislative acknowledgement of an actionable duty
Id., at 27. The Court ratio-

extending to the general public.

nalized, in essence, that a statutory provision allowing suit
creates by reference an actionable duty running to every
injured member of the general public.
not do so.

The statute simply does

SeevRingwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333 P.2d 943

(1959) (where a statute charges one with a duty or imposes a
burden, it must do so with sufficient clarity).
allows suit under certain enumerated conditions.

It merely
If the

statute implies anything it implies that where a duty exists
pursuant to law, suit may then be taken against governmental
employees under the expressed conditions.
The law in Utah is clear.
did in Christenson v. Hayward:

This Court must do here as it
(a) refuse to legislate by

judicial fiat, as the District Court tried to do; and (b) apply
the public duty rule. Accordingly, no actionable duty arises
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between these respondents and appellant's claims are thereby
barred.
POINT VI
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.
While appellant argued below that the Governmental Immunity
Act was unconstitutional, she has not raised this issue on
appeal.

By this omission, the issue of the Act's constitu-

tionality presumably is moot.

In any event, on at least two

separate occasions this Court has upheld the constitutionality
of the Act, as well as the constitutionality of the legal
doctrine of sovereign immunity codified therein.

Madsen v.

Borthick, 658 P.2d at 629; Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d at 94.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the common law of
official immunity, dispositive case law from this Court, and
recent developments in federal case law interpreting discretionary function, mandate that, as a matter of law, these
respondents are immune from suit in this case.

Under the law

and facts of this case, to conclude that the State of Utah or
its employees are liable for the criminal acts of Kenneth
Roberts, would be both legally incorrect and contrary to sound
public policy.

Such a ruling:
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1.

Would emasculate express provisions of the Govern-

mental Immunity Act and result in judicial repeal or amendment
of the Act's discretionary function exception;
2.

Would be directly contrary to prior pronouncements of

this Court, requiring express reversal of all or part of the
following Utah decisions:

Epting v. State, Beal v. Turner,

Sheffield v. Turner, Frank v. State, Little v. Utah State Div.
of Fam. Serv., Madsen v. State, and Emery v. State;
3.

Would be contrary to recent federal case law develop-

ments, including the unanimous United States Supreme Court
decision in Varig Airlines, and in direct contradiction to
long-standing precedent in this Court to follow the lead of
these federal cases;
4.

Would transform the government of the State of Utah

into a "super-insurer" of the well-being of everyone who happens to be damaged or injured within its jurisdictional limits
by someone who, at one time, entered the criminal justice or
corrections systems of the state;
5.

Would require judicial "second-guessing" of legisla-

tive and administrative decisions and thereby take the administration of state corrections out of the hands of corrections
professionals to whom it has been entrusted by law;
6.

Would threaten the fiscal solvency of the State of

Utah, either by a plethora of lawsuits for injury or damage

-91-

inflicted through the criminal acts of former prison inmates,
parolees or halfway house residents, or by the massive spending
needed to house all of those inmates through their entire terms
of sentence, which would be required in order to prevent liability from attaching for these criminal acts committed after
release or transfer from the prison;
7.

Would be contrary to the intent of the State Legis-

lature.
Respondents State of Utah, William Milliken, Leon Hatch and
Weldon Morgan are, as a matter of law, immune from suit.

The

District Court's summary judgment dismissing appellant's claims
against the State of Utah and against Milliken, Hatch and
Morgan in their representative capacities should therefore be
affirmed.

The District Court's denial of summary judgment as

to appellant's claims against Milliken, Hatch and Morgan in
their individual capacities should therefore be reversed, and,
as a matter of law, those claims should be dismissed by this
Court, thereby dismissing with prejudice and on the merits all
of appellant's claims against the state respondents.
Respectfully submitted this ^

day of September, 1986.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Allan/Li Larson
Bruce rfL Jensen
Christopher C. Fuller
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UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
OFFICE

Bl
rj Carlie Christensen
Attorneys for State Respondents
SCM3738C
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AUG 21

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LaDAWN PRUE,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

THE STATE OF UTAH, LEON
HATCH, Deputy Warden of the
Utah State Prison, WILLIAM
MILLIKEN, Personally and as
Director of the Utah State
Department of Corrections,
WELDON MORGAN, Individually
and as Director of the Ogden
Community Corrections Center
FELICIA ROBERTS, and KENNETH
ROBERTS,

CIVIL NO, L-83-H431

Defendants.

The State of Utah and the individual defendants' Motions
for Summary Judgment were heard 1: y
of A u g u s t , 1 9 8 5 .
and

1:1: ie Court

c• i

1 1 :ie • 91h day

T h e p l a i n t i f f w a s represented by George M. Haley

J e f f r e y W e s t o n S h i e l d s , E s q s . , and the d e f e n d a n t s b y Allan

L a r s o n , B r u c e Jensen and Christopher

Pul lei , * -

Chr i s t e n s e n , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General • The C o u r t having p r e v i o u s l y
reviewed

the 325 p a g e s of M e m o r a n d a

submitted

by counsel

e x t e n s i v e o r a ] a r g u m e i 11 o i: :i 11 I e • :5 i f f i c u l t

heard

i s s u e s p r esented .

The C o u r t at the c o n c l u s i o n of oral argument asked for s u p p l e m e n t a l
b r i e f i n g , and took the m a t t e r under a d v i s e m e n t for further
:> f t h e 1 e g a 1 a u t h o i: 11 i e s s \ i bm i 11 ed .

review

PRUE V. STATE

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

FACTS
On December 22, 1982, defendant Kenneth Roberts ("Roberts")
was transferred from the Utah State Prison to the Ogden Community
Correction Center, a halfway house.

This transfer was to prepare

him for an August 9, 1983 parole date.

Roberts was almost imme-

diately thereafter released for a Christmas home visit with
his wife Felicia.

In the early morning hours of December 24,

1982, while Roberts was under the influence of drugs, he brutally
attacked and shot plaintiff LaDawn Prue near her residence inflicting
severe and permanent injuries for which she seeks compensation
in this proceeding.
The plaintiff has cited this Court to over 60 pages of
facts extracted from defendants' records or from the depositions
taken in this proceeding.

The plaintiff in sum claims that

she will establish at trial that the defendants were "grossly
negligent" in that they failed to comply with their own policies
and procedures in releasing Roberts, a known repeat offender
and poor risk, to the Ogden Community Corrections Center, and
ultimately for home leave; and that their "gross negligence"
caused the plaintiff's injuries. For purposes of the defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment, the facts must be taken in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.

P R U E V . STATE

PAGE T H R E E

MEMORANDUM

DECISION

ISSUES
T h e C c • 1 i r t: :i i: i d e c i d i n g
Judgment must determine:

the defend a n t s ' ' M :> t i c i i s

(1)

Whether

f <: :i : S u m rn a r y

the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act is constitutional; (2) Whether

the activities of

the defendants which allegedly caused plaintiff's injuries are
"governmental
its statutory

function11;

immunity

(3) Whether

the State has waived
S *: ^ t ion

from suit under

63-30 -1 0 (] ) ,

Utah Code A n n . ; (4) Whether any exception

t;- the general

of immunity is applicable in this case;

Whether the individual

defendants
acted

are l e g a l l y

or f a i l e d

Whether

t o a c t in - " g r o s s l y

the d e f e n d a n t s

whether

!

responsible

"du./1

owe

11 i e i :i : acts can be.

H plaintiff

negligent

-v. t h e y

m a n n e r " ; (6)

'he p l a i n t i f f

he legal

waiver

and thus

s... -.-. of 11 :ie p] ain11 f f '" s

injuries.
Before

proceeding

with the legal analysis mandated by the

defendants' M o t i o n s , the C o u r t
at

issue

wishes

in t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s .

case establish a grievous

injury

to c l a r i f y

what

is not

The uncontested

facts of this

tu an i n n o c e n t

v i c t i m , by a

criminal under the supervision of f h e state correctional system.
Whether

the State should be financially

victims when
citizens

the S t a t e 1

is a policy q u e s t ic,.i.

:

responsible to innocent

have fai ] ed t : • pi:otec 1 its
,.,**-, p o l i c y

questioi ) m u s t b e

answered by our State legislature not this Court,
h a s d e a 11 w i 11 i t h i s d i f f i c u 11 p o 11 c y

The legislature

I s s u e 1 : »y

p a s s I n•g t h e IJ t a h
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The State to this date does not

have a Victim Reparation Fund although a majority
have such a resource.

of states

This Court makes no statement as to the

soundness of these policy decisions as it is beyond the power
and duties of this Court.

Although this case presents the difficult

conflict between the State's responsibility to victims of criminals
and the need to protect the public treasury, this Court's inquiry
of necessity will be limited as its constitutional responsibility
is to enforce the laws as passed by our legislature and as interpeted
by the Utah Supreme Court.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I.
A_.

STATE OF UTAH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

The Utah Supreme Court has on two separate occasions found
the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act, Section 63-30-3, et seq.,

Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1983)
v. Borthick, 658 P.2d
P.2d

92

(Utah 1978).

627

("Act") constitutional.

Madsen

(Utah 1983); Madsen v. State, 583

This Court

is governed by the position

taken by the Utah Supreme Court, and any arguments as to the
soundness of these prior decisions must be reserved for argument
before that Court.
B.

THE HOUSING AND REHABILITATION OF CRIMINALS IS A "GOVERN-

MENTAL FUNCTION".
Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act states:

PRUE V. STATE

PAGE FIVE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

E x c e p t a s may be o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d i n t h i s
A c t , a l l g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s a r e immune
from s u i t f o r any i n j u r y which r e s u l t s from
t h e e x e r c i s e of a g o v e r n m e n t a l
function
• • • •
[Emphasis a d d e d ]
The

Utah

2d 314 ( 1 9 6 8 ) ,

Supreme

C < :> i i r 1 i i i S h e f f i e l d

v.

Turnei

Utah

states:

There can be no question but that the maintenance
of a state prison and the keeping of prisoners
therein is a necessary auxiliary of government
and therefore a governmental function, nor
that consequently the performance of the
duties incident thereto would normally be
protected by the traditional rule of sovereign
immunity.
Id. at 316.
The Utah Supreme Court after Sheffield , supra, outlined
a specific test to determine whether
omental
entitled

exercise of a "govei niPt'ii t.a I turn I iun"

to governmental

City Corp., 605 P.2d
City Corp., 6 29
narrowed

or not the activity of

1230
.

immunity.

Standiford

v. Salt Lake

(Utah 1980), Johnson v. Sal t Lake
. ^

test, because the running

' TQfl M .

Even under this

of a correctional

" es se n t i a 1 t c t he c ore o f governmental activity"
'\ tvernmental f i ::n i< :1 J ; i "

Standiford , a '

system
it is a

" f i s a "function

which by its very nature is a unique responsibility of the state,
and siiuuid ouj-y ue performed
representative.

by the state'f i

Johnson, at 434.

Lts desi gnated

Since the acts complained

of by the plaintiff arise out of the administration of the State's
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correctional system, they are an exercise of a "governmental
function" qualifying for the general immunity provided by Section
63-30-3 of the Act.
C.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS SOUND IN NEGLIGENCE AND THUS ARE

WITHIN THE WAIVER OF IMMUNITY IN SECTION 63-30-10(1).
Plaintiff asserts that the State has waived immunity pursuant
to Section 63-30-10(1):
Immunity from suit of all government entities
is waived for injury (1) proximately caused
by a negligent act or omission of an employee
committed within the scope of his employment.
Defendants claim that four of the causes of action of the
plaintiff/ namely, the second, fifth, sixth and eighth claims
for relief do not allege any circumstance for which immunity
is waived by the Act.

The gravamen of plaintiff's claims sound

in negligence, even though the term "negligence" is not used
in each claim.

Thus the plaintiff has stated claims which qualify

for the waiver of immunity in Section 63-30-10(1).
The Court will deal with the defendants' arguments that
the plaintiff's injury was not "proximately caused by a negligent
act or omission of an employee" in subsequent sections of this
Opinion.
D.

THE ACTIONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH ARE EXCEPTED FROM

THE WAIVER OF IMMUNITY IN SECTION 63-30-10(1) AS THEY "ARISE
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O K PERFORMANCE OR THE FAILURE TO

EXERCISE

OR PERFORM A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION".
Section

63-30-10(1)

enumerates particular

11: 1 e g e n e r a 1 w a I v e r a f i i n m i :i i 1 1 1 y

exceptions

to

f ::) r e m p ] a y e e i i e g 1 i g e n c e .

The

w a i v e r and the a p p l i c a b l e e x c e p t i o n read as f o l l o w s :
(1)
I m m u n i t y from suit of all government
e n t i t i e s is w a i v e d for injury p r o x i m a t e l y
caused by a n e g l i g e n t act or o m i s s i o n of
an e m p l o y e e c o m m i t t e d w i t h i n the scope of
his e m p l o y m e n t , except if the injury:
(a)
arises out of the e x e r c i s e or p e r f o r m a n c e
or t h e f a i l u r e to e x e r c i s e or p e r f o r m a
discretionary f u n c t i o n , w h e t h e r or not the
discretion is abused.
In Epting v. The State of Utah, 546 P.2d

242

(Utah 1 9 7 6 ) ,

the Utah Supreme Court held that the State was immune from suit
u n d e r 11 I e • f" :i I s a r e t i o n a r ] r f i i n c t i o i: ::t,!f e x a e p t i • :> i :i t :> 11: I e s t a t u t o r y
waiver of immunity w h e r e a p r i s o n e r

under

the s u p e r v i s i o n

of

the board of corrections murdered a victim while on work release.
The Epting
authorities

court

recognized

in developing

the difficul ties

facing

prison

rehabilitation programs, and applying

those programs to particular prisoners.

The court states:

In regard to the problem: whether the placing
of a p r i s o n e r in a work r e l e a s e p r o g r a m
c o m e s wi t h i n s u b s e c t i o n (] ) a b o v e q u o t e d
as the the exercise. . . [of]. . . a discretionary function,. . . we make the following
observations:
T h e p r i s o n a u t h o r i t i e s are
faced with a dilemma which has always existed
in p e n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s : as to w h a t e x t e n t
they are furnishing an education for further
crime, or for the rehabilitation of prisoners
into useful c i t i z e n s h i p . .
But that
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is within the discretion of the
prison
authorities to decide. In addition to the
exercise of this judgment as to the value
and practicability of such a program generally,
there are problems about its advisability
as to each individual prisoner. In order
to weigh the positive values of possible
benefit for him in such a program against
the negative factors such as the likelihood
of his escaping and engaging in more anti-social
conduct, it is essential to consider the
various aspects of his personality: his
intelligence, aptitudes and qualities of
character. . . Accordingly, we agree with
the view of the trial court that the handling
of the prisoner Michael Hart was something
which "arises out of the exercise of a discretionary function" for which subsection
(1) of section 63-30-10(1) quoted above
has retained its sovereign immunity.
546 P.2d at 244.
The Court can see no distinction between the facts in Epting
and the facts presented by this case.

The adoption of a general

program of home visits, and the decision to place an individual
such as defendant into this status involve the same policy evaluations which are required to adopt a work release program generally,
and to place a particular prisoner in a work release program.
The plaintiff seeks to distinguish Epting by claiming that
although the establishment of policies and procedures concerning
the transfer of inmates within the penal system is a discretionary
function entitled to immunity under Epting, that once it can
be alleged that the State has failed to follow its own policy
and procedures, its acts are no longer a "discretionary function."
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Plaintiff's Memorandum In Opposition to Defendants1

Motion

for Summary Judgment, at- page 69.
The Court
as the stdtut.

finds

tru

• ...-,.

p t aintiff's

argument

-1 spos 11 :i v*- ,

unpersuasive,

11 states 1 it lat there

is immunity not just for the "exercise or performance" of a
discretionary
per for

function, bui tor the "failure t<» exercise or

discretionary function, whether

is abused."

>\ nut

the discretion

Thus, although the failure of the defendants to

follow their own policies and procedures is definitely relevant
t

negligence, this Court does not see its

applicability

the issue of immunity.

Plaintiffs cite the recent Supreme Court
v, Utah State Division

ra&*> nf L1111 e

of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah

1943) as supportive of their argument,

The Court states:

The acts complained of here are the state's
failure to properly evaluate the home into
which Jennifer was to be placed, failure
to properly supervise her placement, and
failure to protect her from harm when the
State knew or should have known that such
harm was likely. Assuming that the decision
to place Jennifer in a foster home was a
discretionary one, once that decision was
made and the placement occurred, the question
was no longer whether the child was to receive
foster care, but whether due care was exercised
under a duty assumed. Where a breach of
that duty can be shown, the government is
held to the same standard as private individuals,
and cannot cloak itself with the mantle
of discretion.
Id. at 51
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The language cited from Little merely restates the Supreme
Court's continued adherence to the distinction between a ministerial
and a policy level act.

See, discussion at p. 13, infra.

Other

language of the Court in Little would support this conclusion:
Decision of attorney general to place an
insane prisoner in a mental institution
and decision of parole board to release
prisoner on parole are discretionary functions.
Id. at 52.
The plaintiff next argues that Epting is no longer controlling
law in Utah as the recent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court
adopt a new ministerial versus policy level analysis, and that
Epting has been overruled sub silencio . This argument is undermined
by the case of Carroll v. State Road Commission, 27 Utah 2d
384 (1972), decided several years before Epting. In this case
the Utah Supreme Court held that a state road supervisor's decision
to use berms as a sole means of warning highway travelers that
a road was closed and should not be traveled was not a basic
policy decision essential to the realization or accomplishment
of some basic governmental policy, program or objective and
was thus not immune.

In arriving at this decision, the court

adopted a policy level operational ministerial level analysis.
The court states:
The principle is that although basic policy
decisions are allowed immunity, this exception
is not extended to the ministerial implementation
of that basic policy.
Id.
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this Court must assume that the court
iinaJ ybJ.j pt w i ous J y adopted

appl yin<
supported
613
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in the recent

• .

(Utah

of F a m i l y

cases

of Frank

in Kpt in j was

in Carroll , and further
v. The State of Utah,

198 0) , ,ind L i 11 J e v , U t a 11 State

Services, 667 P.2d 49 (it.. 1 9 8 3 ) .

Division

Furthermore, the

language in Carroll is supportive of r.nis Court's finding today.
The court in Carroll states:
. . . [A] valid consideration in evaluating
a factual s i t u a t i o n w a s w h e t h e r there w a s
a reason for s o v e r e i g n immunity, i.e., did
the e m p l o y e e ' s d e c i s i o n . , , r i s e to t h e
l e v e l of g o v e r n m e n t a l d e c i s i o n s t o w a r d s
which judicial restraint should be exercised.
Id. at 389
The

professional

judgment

to the status of prisoners
decision

toward

Again,
Utah

which

L i i Frank

of c o r r e c t i o n a l

is just

personnel

the

.licy

judicial, restraint

sruula

v. State , 6 1 3 P . 2 d 51 ?

psychologist

that the negligence

resulted

found that the psych
but m i n i s t e r i a l .

making

^e exercised.
(Utah 1 9 8 0 ) , the

Supreme Court refi ise< 3 t J ) shiel < 3 1 1 ic state

the plaintiff alleged

as

I: rom su i L where

of a state

employed

;he suicide of his son, as the court.
-

"" !'•

Nevertheless,

WHM>

H

i \t>\\d\\y

I he language

di -

onary,

of Frank, again

supports the earlier holding in Epting and this Court's decision.
Th«

• •

The exception was intended to s h i e l d ,
those government acts and decisions impacting
on l a r g e numbers of people in a myriad of

PRUE V. STATE

PAGE TWELVE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

unforseeable ways from individual and class
legal actions the continual threat of which
would make public administration all but
impossible.
Id. at 519-520.
A removal of the shield of governmental immunity in correctional
policy making areas would submit the State in a "myriad of unforseeable ways to individual and class legal actions, the continual
threat of which would make public administration all but impossible."
In Beal v. Turner, Warden, 22 Utah 2d 418 (1969), the Utah
court enunciates the policy behind affording discretion in a
case such as is before the Court today:
The Board of Pardons and the men in the
Adult Probation and Parole Department are
striving in a professional way to rehabilitate
adjudicated criminals, so that these criminals
may take their place in a law-abiding society.
To accomplish this o b j e c t i v e , the Board
of Pardons and the Adult Probation and Parole
Department must have leeway in taking chances
and enlarging the ambit of a promising prisoner.
(Even) when the confidence which they had
in the parolee is (later) seen to be misplaced. . . .
454 P.2d at 626.
The plaintiff further claims that analysis of the discretion
involved in placing defendant Roberts into a halfway house and
ultimately

on home leave does not meet the four part test set

out in Little, supra, at p.11.

This Court disagrees.

The decision

to classify a prisoner by the Department of Corrections, whether
that decision is made at the Board

of Pardons level or by an
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employee at a halfway house, is a basic policy making decision
ii :i. wlii 'h

i m/r M I

Interference with

,' JIKJ piogLdJii f actcrs m u s t be
r

••• d i s c r e t i o n

involved

iii such

analyzed.

a decision

could change the course and direction of the S t a t e 1 s correctional
pin .- r - ,.

~ '"• /.. . -.-

four questions p o s e d .
The most

••

urt- c a n a n s w e r

affirmatively the

Little at p, .1 ,

troubling

argument m a d e by the plaintiff

is that

the Utah Supreme Court has adopted an analysis of the "discretionary
f u n c t i o n " exception which gives employees exercising
in the upper echelons of go\ J -^ent
policy

decisions, but denies

a< t s .

The plaintiff

i mm ui i i ty f c • r d i sc r e t i o n a r y

immunity

t r e n c h e s , since they merely p e r f o r m
.J. ;•

discretion

to b u r e a u c r a t s

ministerial,

ii :i the

implementing

for t h i s p o s i t i o n

in the

recent cases of Frank v. S t a t e , 61 * v * ;A *.i" iijtah 1 9 8 0 ) , Bigelow
i . I n g e r s o l l , 6 1 8 P.2d 50 (Utah 1 9 8 0 ) ,
of F a m i l y
the

S e r v i c e s , ••*

language

upon

which

.:

and L j / J _ _

.' ^ P 1 ^ 9 ^ .

t h e plaintiff

relies

ivision

A n e x a m p l e of

is the following

from Frank;
In t h i s r e g a r d , t h i s C o u r t h a s f o l l o w e d
the lead of cases i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e F e d e r a l
Tort Claims Act by distinguishing between
those decisions occurring at a broad, policym a k i n g l e v e l a n d those taking place at the
implementing, "operational" l e v e l . In Carroll
v. State Road C o m m i s s i o n , this C o u r t , recognized
that almost all acts require some degree
of discretion, and observed that the exception
to the waiver set forth in the Act should
be confined to those decisions and acts
occurring at the "basic policy-making level,"
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those acts and decisions
operational level, or f
. . those which concern
matters, not requiring
policy factors."

this Court admits that the language of the Utah

Supreme Court confuses the issue between the level at which
the decision

is made and the nature of the decision involved,

a reference to the cases referred
Claims Act clarifies

to under the Federal

this important distinction.

Tort

The seminal

case under the Federal Tort Claims Act on discretionary function
is Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).

In Dalehite,

the court discussed at length the discretionary function exception
of the Federal Tort Claims Act coining the analysis of policy
versus ministerial.

However, the court held that discretionary

function includes:
More than initiation of programs and activities
in that where there is room for policy judgment
and decision, there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordinants
in carrying out the operations of government
in accordance with official directions cannot
be actionable.
Id. at 35-36.
Some federal court cases following Dalehite narrowly focused
on the term "policy" and developed
determining
exception.

the applicability

a dichotomy analysis for

of the discretionary

These cases drew an imaginary

function

line between upper
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echelon " \. »1 icy levei" d e c i s i o n m a k e r s , and lower level "operational"
employees

charged

with

executing

«••

implementing

t^.c t-;

The plaintiff would claim

tie policy.

-i

Utial1 S u p r e m e Court has adoptee.

vh:i < : 1 i t he

.< :;; >upreme Court

case

of U n i t e d

S t a t e s v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Area Rio Grandense,

104 S.

27 55 (1.984)

is nc . a v a l i d

-••-•*

interpretation

« -at the ] eve J oriented
of t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y

exception under the Federal Tort Claims A c t .
Courl. discussed
in determining
liability

sever.il
whether

fdcturs which
acts

by t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y

fuoctio:

function

Rather, trie Supreme

it recommended

of g o v e r n m e n t

analysis

to be used

are protected
., %~r

from
; st

fact'T discussed by the court effectively prohibits consideration
of

the actor's

rank

or h i s h i e r a r c h i c a l

decision making process

position

11 :i 3etermIni n< I whether

function exception applies.

w i t h i n the

the discretioi iary

The Court states:

The basic inquiry concerning the application
of t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y f u n c t i o n e x c e p t i o n
is whether the challenged acts of a government
employee, whatever his or her rank, are
of a nature and quality that congress intended
to shield from tort liability.
Id. at 27 6 5
T I: I i s C

'

v v.

versus policy dichotomy
that

thi.c

- -r

federal

court's

e m . i nisteria 1

to be the better-reasoned,

" *.iic l a n g u a g e
has

. ;si s of

cited

indicated

direction

under

and a s s u m e s

b y t h e pi ai nt i ff irieai is

an in tent ion
the Federal

t o f o11o w the

Tort Claims A c t .
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If it is the same broad policy factors which must be considered,
this Court can see no difference between their consideration
by the Board of Pardons in determining whether or not someone
should be placed on parole, and their consideration by the director
of a halfway house in determining whether or not an inmate should
be granted work release or home leave.

It is the nature of

the discretionary act, not the level at which it is made which
should be analyzed.
Finally, this Court does not believe it leads to the orderly
administration of justice for a trial court to assume that a
case which is controlling precedent has been overruled without
comment by the Supreme Court.

If Epting is no longer the law,

it is the Utah Supreme Court's responsibility to so state.
The Utah Supreme Court, the U. S. Supreme Court, and numerous
other state courts have looked to the nature and quality of
corrections decisions, and have concluded that these decisions
are the type of acts which were intended to be protected by
the "discretionary function" exception.

Thus, this Court finds

that the acts complained of by the plaintiff "arise out of the
exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function," and thus that the State of Utah is
immune from liability.
Because this Court has found that the "discretionary function"
exception is applicable, it need not reach the issue of the
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incarceration exception, ot Liie public duty doctrine as it applies
to t J: :i€ • S t a t e

c £ I Jt .at 1

However , in passing , this Cour t comments

that the language cited by the defendants from Epting v. State
would

indicate that the conduct complained

of wnuhl also be

covered by the incarceration exception to the Governmental Immunity
Act

:alfway house is an

•. reme Court has held that a \ lospital when-- onr J/. committed

a •" »
under

"other place of legal confinement"

a

<<"-;i ~rdei* is such a place,

2d 1 (1.

Emery v. State, 26 Utah

it iidtic'A :^oje is since the plaintiff's
\ • defends

arose wh-

Roberts was qrar

leave from this halfway house, whether
place OL legal confinement.

:

injury

temporary home

r. - was still

within a

This court need not decide that

issue, but believes that it is an issue which needs clarification
from our Supreme Court.
The issue of duty
this opinion dealing

-

WIL.I U*C

xi\di

-^ - • -". i.

* ,

:*

id^.n defendants.

II.

INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A.

THE

RESENTATIVE

INDIVIDUAL

DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE

IN THEIR REP-

CAPACITY.

The U t a h Supreme Cour t i n Mad sen v . Borthick , 658 P . 2 d
627

(1 11 a I :t ] 9 8 3 ) h a s r e c e i :i 1 1 y d e c ] a r e d t h a t t h e G o e i: n n i e n t a 1

Immunity Act is the exclusive remedy against governmental employees,
and that a government official
i

or employee can only be sued

representative capacity in an actioi:t against a governmental
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is liable.

that the State

of

Id. at 633.

Utah

is not

Since

liable

as

it is shielded by governmental immunity, the individual defendants
in their representative capacity are also shielded by that immunity.
BJJ
ACTS

THE

OR

INDIVIDUAL

OMISSIONS

DEFENDANTS

CAUSING

INJURY

ARE
TO

PERSONALLY

LIABLE

THE PLAINTIFF

FOR

IF SHE CAN

ESTABLISH THAT THE EMPLOYEES ACTED OR FAILED TO ACT DUE TO GROSS
NEGLIGENCE, FRAUD OR MALICE.
The

plaintiff

proposition
under

the

for

their

P.2d

925

1979);

that

mistakenly

the legislature

Governmental
negligence.
(Utah

Frank

quotes

1977);

pre-1978

intended

Immunity

Acts

that

against

State

517

the

allowed

employees

v. Larsen, 571

v. Billings, 600 P.2d

v. S t a t e , 613 P.2d

for

suits be

See, generally, Cornwall
Schmitt

cases

(Utah 1980).

516

(Utah

However, in

the Governmental Immunity Act amendments of 1978, the legislature
added

the following

provisions

on official

immunity

in

63-30-4:

The remedy a g a i n s t a governmental e n t i t y
or i t s employee for an i n j u r y caused by
an a c t or omission which occurs during the
performance of such employee's d u t i e s i s
after the e f f e c t i v e date of t h i s act exclusive
of any o t h e r c i v i l a c t i o n or p r o c e e d i n g
by reason of the same subject matter against
the employee or the e s t a t e of the employee
whose act or omission gave r i s e to the claim,
u n l e s s t h e employee acted or failed to act
through gross negligence, fraud or malice.

Section
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As the court clearly held in Madsen v. Borthicky 658 P.2d
627 (Utah 1983):
The apparent purpose of these two paragraphs
is to replace the common law of official
immunity and its distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts or omissions
with a new standard coordinated with the
standard of governmental immunity established
in the Governmental Immunity Act.
The court continues:
The second quoted paragraph of Section 63-30-4
reaffirms that the employee will not be
personally liable unless he or she acted
or failed to act due to gross negligence,
fraud or malice. The second paragraph also
a representative capacity in an action against
the governmental entity, but only where
the act or omission is one for which the
governmental entity may be liable under
the Governmental Immunity Act.
Thus, employees of State entities lose the protection of
the Act and can be sued in their personal capacity if they act
or fail to act through gross negligence, fraud or malice.
The individual defendants disagree with the plaintiff's
argument that it is an issue of fact for the jury to determine
whether or not the individual defendants' omissions and acts
amounted to "gross negligence" within the meaning of the statute.
The defendants first claim that the 1983 amendment to Section
63-30-4 of the Act wherein the term "gross negligence" was eliminated
bars the plaintiff's suit.
was March 10, 1983.

The effective date of the amendment

The plaintiff's cause of action arose on
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It is the statute which was in effect at

the time the plaintiff's cause of action arose which must apply.
This is reinforced by both statutory and case law in Utah.
In Section 68-3-3 of Utah Code Ann., it states:
Revised statutes not retroactive. No part
of these revised statutes is retroactive
unless expressly so declared.
There is no such declaration of retroactive application
in the 1983 amendments.

Furthermore in the case of Okland Con-

struction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974),
the Utah Supreme Court states:
It is true, as the employer Okland contends:
that it is entitled to have its rights determined
on the basis of the law as it existed at
the time of the occurrence; and that a later
statute or amendment should not be applied
in a retroactive manner to deprive a party
of his rights or impose greater liability
upon him.
Defendants attempt to escape this well accepted principle
by stating that the plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue
until she had filed a proper notice of claim, had waited the
required period, and could proceed

in court under the Act.

Defendants claim that since the plaintiff's action is created
by the Act, her cause of action cannot arise until she has complied
with the conditions of that Act.

The problem with this argument

is that employees are within the ambient of the Act, but not
when it is alleged that their conduct arises out of gross negligence,
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malice or fraud. Thus, the Act has no application to the plaintiff's
claim against these defendants in their personal capacity.
The defendants next argue that a statute or amendment may
be applied retroactively if vested or contractual rights are
not enlarged, eliminated or destroyed, citing State Dept. of
Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982).

However,

this case offers defendants no support as it deals with changes
in the law strictly procedural, and not affecting substantive
rights.

The court in this case in fact states the well accepted

principle argued by the plaintiff:
These authorities state the well established
rule that statutory enactments which affect
substantive or vested rights generally operate
only prospectively.
Id. at 1000.
It is difficult to see how the removal of a plaintiff's
right to sue for "gross negligence" does not take away substantive
rights.
Finally, the defendants cite Haddenham v. State, 550 P.2d
9 (Wash. 1976) for the proposition that abolition by the legislature
of an accrued cause of action based upon statute does not violate
any rights of plaintiff, because a tort cause of action is not
vested until it is reduced to judgment.

This case stands for

no such proposition. Rather, the case holds that statutes normally
will be construed to operate prospectively only, unless they
have a remedial effect:
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. . • . Where, however a statute is remedial,
and its remedial purpose is furthered by
retroactive application, the presumption
favoring perspective application is reversed,
o . . . Remedial statutes in general afford
a remedy or better or forward remedies than
those already existing for the enforcements
of rights and redress of injuries
The
intent of the Crime Victims Compensation
Act is to compensate and assist the residents
of Washington who are innocent victims of
criminal acts.
Its purpose is patently
remedial.
Id. at 12.
Thus, the court allowed retroactive application only because
it found the statute in question which allowed compensation
for the victim enlarged the rights of the plaintiff and was
remedial.

The change made by the 1983 amendment certainly is

not remedial as it eliminates any remedy for the plaintiff.
Finally, the defendants attempt to persuade this Court
that the purpose of the 1983 amendment eliminating "gross negligence"
was simply to clarify the meaning of the earlier enactment.
This Court finds this a strained argument, as the 1983 statute
clearly sought to eliminate substantive rights which it had
previously granted.
Finally, the defendants argue that even if the 1978 law
applies, that the facts taken in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff do not state a cause of action for gross negligence.
The defendants1 argument is based upon common law prior to the
1978 amendments to the Act, which indicates generally that public
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employees will not be held responsible if they were acting honestly
and in good faith within the scope of their authority.

However,

the Utah Supreme Court has made it clear in Madsen v. Borthick,
supra, that the prior common law with respect to the liability
of officials is no longer relevant, and that the language of
the Act applying to employees must control.
Therefore, taking the term "gross negligence" as somewhere
between simple negligence and intentional wrong doing, this
Court is persuaded that the facts alleged by the plaintiff,
if proven, could be found by a jury to establish "gross negligence."
C.

THE DEFENDANTS OWE A DUTY TO THE PLAINTIFF.

Before the individual defendants can be found legally liable
for the plaintiff's injury, it must be established that there
is a duty between the parties.

Plaintiff cannot recover against

these defendants if the only duty owed to her was a public or
general duty.

18 McClelland, The Law of Municipal Corporations,

Section 53.046 at 165 (Third Ed. 1971).
has been recognized in Utah.

This public duty rule

In Obray v. Malmberg , 26 Utah

2d 17, 484 P.2d 160 (1971), the Utah Supreme Court declared
that the failure of a sheriff to investigate, and not actionable
by an individual, since the public official's duty is to the
public.

Again, in Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah

1984), where two deputy sheriffs were allegedly negligent in
failing to arrest a motorcyclist they had reason to believe
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was drunk/ and he was later killed when he failed to negotiate
a curve, the court refused to find any duty based upon the statutory
duty of the defendants to preserve

the peace and make

lawful

arrests. The court, however, stressed that the individual defendants
undertook no duty, excepting

employment as a police officer,

a duty owed to the public. The language of the court is instructive:
Appellants did not allege that the officer
assured Michael Stout he would take care
of him, or by his words or conduct induce
him to rely on the officer's protection.
Appellants did not allege that the officer
in any way induced him into a false sense
of security.
In sum, appellants failed
to allege a common law legal duty owed to
them by the city and/or the officer.
Id. at 613.
Another

case which

is instructive on duty is the recent

Supreme Court case of Little v. Utah State Division of Family
Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983).

In this case, as discussed

infra, the Court found that the Division of Family
had breached

a duty when

it was alleged

that it negligently

caused the wrongful death of an infant by failing
evaluate a foster home, and failing
placement in the home.
though

Services

to properly

to supervise the child's

Here, the court clearly held that even

the Division of Family Services had a duty generally

to the public, that it also had

individualized

the plaintiff by affirmatively acting in the area.

that duty to
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There is no controlling case authority in Utah as to whether
the defendants as correctional authorities charged with the
responsibility to incarcerate, manage, supervise and rehabilitate
violent and dangerous offenders owe a duty to act reasonably
to protect the general public from these individuals.

The case

law nationally is split, and this is a new and developing area
of the law. This Court, since there is no Utah authority directly
on point, has taken the liberty to examine the authority from
other jurisdictions, and has determined that the better-reasoned
cases follow Section 319 of the Restatement of Torts Second,
which states:
Duty of those in charge of person having
dangerous propensities. One who takes charge
of a third person whom he knows or should
know to be likely to cause bodily harm to
others if not controlled is under a duty
to exercise reasonable care to control the
third person to prevent him from doing harm.
The difference between this duty and the general no liability
for public duty in law enforcement situations is well addressed
by Howard Nelson in his Law Review article entitled, "Victim's
Suits Against Government Entities and Officials for Reckless
Release," (Vol. 29: 595, 1980):
The [ p u b l i c duty] r u l e i s g e n e r a l l y used
to deny c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e government for
f a i l u r e to provide public s e r v i c e s designed
to b e n e f i t t h e community a t l a r g e such as
police protection.
The duty to c o n t r o l
the conduct of another based upon the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s does not a r i s e
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in cases involving the failure to provide
services.
When a victim is attacked by
an assailant against whom police protection
has been refused, there is no duty owed
to the victim, because there is no relationship
between the police and the assailant. Furthermore, there is clearly no voluntary assumption
of a duty by the police when they fail to
provide protection to a citizen. In release
situations, however, the government has
voluntarily assumed the control of an inmate
by placing him in a detentional facility.
A duty to the victim arises out of this
voluntary assumption of custodial responsibility
by the government.
This analysis has been adopted by many neighboring states:
Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227 (Ariz.
1977); State v. Silva, 478 P.2d 591 (Nev. 1971); White v. State,
661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983); Upchurch v. State, 454 P.2d 112
(Hawaii 1969); Mason v. State, 689 P.2d 199 (Colo. Ct App. ,
1984).

The Court finds particularly persuasive the authorities

cited and the reasoning expressed by the Kansas Supreme Court
in the recent decision of Cansler v. State of Kansas, 675 P.2d
57 (Kan. 1984).
The defendants argue that since governmental immunity is
alive and well in Utah, that this indicates a legislative intent
against creating a private cause of action in cases such as
this.

It is true that the legislature has chosen to insulate

the State and even its negligent employees working in discretionary
decision making areas such as corrections from liability generally.
However, the legislature has specifically carved out an area
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in which it will allow citizens redress (when the employee acts
with "gross negligence, fraud or malice").

This indicates that

the legislature would support a private cause of action to deter
employee conduct of such an egregious nature and to compensate
an innocent victim who suffers as a result of this conduct.
Furthermore, the legislature can, has and will continue
to close areas of liability which it feels are contrary to the
public interest.

In fact, Ms. Prue could not recover if her

cause of action were to arise today because the legislature
by amendment in 1983 removed "gross negligence" from the statute.
Thus, any argument as to the flood of potential liability which
this Court's holding may create is not persuasive.
D.

THE ISSUES OF BREACH OF DUTY AND FORSEEABILITY ARE

ISSUES OF FACT WHICH MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE JURY.
Based upon the above-cited authority and the analysis of
the Court, the State of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted on the basis of governmental immunity.

The Motions

for Summary Judgment of the individual defendants are denied
as this Court finds that the plaintiff has stated facts which,
if proved, could allow a jury to find that the "gross negligence"
of the individual defendants acting in their personal capacity
proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.
The Court directs counsel for the plaintiff to prepare
an Order in conformance with this Court's Memorandum Decision,
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submit it to counsel for the defendants, and then to the Court
for signature.
Dated this

&\/

day of August, 1985.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following this

21

day of August, 1985:

George M. Haley
Attorney for Plaintiff
175 S. Main, 10th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jeffrey Weston Shields
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 West 300 South, #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Allan L. Larson
Bruce H. Jensen
Christopher Fuller
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Carlie Christensen
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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vP ATTORNEY GENERA£ *
January 10, 1983

Office of Attorney General
STATE OF UTAH
Utah State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE AND CLAIM
In accordance with the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. 163-30-12,
as amended, you are hereby notlfed that LA DAWN PRUE, by and through
her attorneys, SHIELDS & SHIELDS, 1s herewith making claim for
InjjuHes she received on December 22, 1982 and/or December 23, 1982,
when she was shot twice with a .357 caliber gun by an Individual
released from the Utah State Prison, allegedly to a "halfway house"
facility.
Said LA DAWN PRUE 1s eighteen years of age and as a direct and
proximate cause of the above-captloned events, claimant has teen
rendered a parapaleglc for the remainder of her life which has been
predicted to be of normal length.
Said LA DAWN PRUE alleges that the State of Utah was negligent
and/or grossly negligent 1n allowing the release of the Individual
who shot her out of prison and that the State of Utah had knowledge,
or should have known, that said Individual harbored dangerous and
violent propensities and was not a fit candidate for Incorporation
Into society, and that the State of Utah has therefore fallen below
its duty to protect the claimant from known dangerous felons, all
proximately resulting 1n her present severe Injuries. Claimant
further alleges that the acts of the State of Utah as above set forth
resulted In the deprivation of her civil rights as defined by Title
42, United States Code, S1983 and the United States Constitution.
LA DAWN PRUE herewith demands monetary compensation in a sum
reasonable and .proper to compensate her for her debilitated physical
condition, pain and suffering, fear, loss of future employment opportunity, medical and surgical expenses presently expended and to be
expended In the future, loss of present wages and Income and such other
and further relief as 1s just, equitable and appropriate 1n the premises.

Office of Attorney General
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE ANO CLAIM
January 10, 1983
Psoe 2

¥ou are further notified that after the passage of ninety (90)
days or the refusal of the State of Utah to settle the above set
out claim, said LA DAWH PRUE Intends to commence an action In the
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Division, for relief as demanded above on the grounds set forth above.
. All correspondence or communication regarding the above matters
1s to be directed to the following:
Jeffrey Weston Shields
SHIELDS & SHIELDS
243 East Fourth South
Suite 303, Shields i6ii1ld1ng
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)328-4703
n e a s e y w c n i yourselves accordingly.
SHIELDS & SHIELDS

APPENDIX "D"

George M. Haley
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
600 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
J e f f r e y Weston S h i e l d s
SHIELDS & SHIELDS
243 East Fourth South
S u i t e 303, S h i e l d s Building
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-4703
Attorneys for Claimant

—oooOooo-LaDAWN PRUE,

AMENDED
NOTICE OF CLAIM
AND INTENT TO SUE

Claimant,
-vsSTATE OF UTAH, WILLIAM MILLIKEN,
personally and as Director of the
UTAH STATE DIVISION OF
CORRECTIONS, THE UTAH STATE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE,
OGDEN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS
CENTER, JOHN DOES 1-10 and ABC
AGENCY 1-10,
Defendants.
•oooOooo

Comes now the claimantf LaDawn Prue, by and through her
counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields, of Shields & Shields, and George
M. Haley, of Kipp and Christian, P.C., and pursuant to U.C.A. 6330-1, et seq.f

(1953, as Amended), hereby file and amend the

required Notice of Claim filed by the Claimant on January 10,
1983, as follows:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Claimant is a resident of Salt Lake County, State

2.

On or about December 22, 1982, the claimant, LaDawn

of Utah.

Prue, was shot twice by Kenneth Roberts in front of her home for
no apparent reason.
3.

As a direct and proximate cause of Kenneth Roberts

action, the claimant

has been rendered

a paraplegic

for the

remainder of her life due to the fact that her spinal cord was
severed by the gunshot wounds.

Due to her disability, claimant

is unemployable, requires present and future medical expenses, is
suffering from ongoing pain and mental distress and loss of body
function.
4.

Claimant is informed and believes that prior to the

time of Kenneth Roberts' release from Utah State Prison, he was
J CHRISTIAN PC
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incarcerated for a number of violent and aggravated criminal acts
in the "A" Block of the Utah State Prison, a secure area of the
medium

security

area of the prison reseerved

for dangerous or

problem inmates.
5.
that

Upon information and belief, the claimant alleges

the State of Utah, by and

through

their agents, William

Milliken, Director of the Utah State Division of Corrections, and
others, were cognizant of Kenneth Roberts1 dangerous and violent
propensities*
6.

Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that

Kenneth Roberts communicated

to the Board of Pardons, prior to

his release, that he felt he was not a fit candidate for release
and could not handle the outside world.
7.

Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that

in August of 1982, the Board of Pardons denied Kenneth Roberts
parole and determined

that he would not be reviewed for parole

prior to August of 1983.
8.

Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that

Kenneth Roberts1 criminal record and psychological profile indicate that he was not a reasonable or fit person for parole, or for
release

into the general public, or

Community Corrections Center.
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for release to the Ogden

9.
in

spite

of

Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that
the

foregoing,

William

Milliken

acting

in his

capacity as Director of the Division of Corrections authorized
and ordered the release of Kenneth Roberts to the Ogden Community
Center Halfway House, knowing that said halfway house would be
closed for Christmas and that Kenneth Roberts would be released
from the halfway house to the public at large.
10.

Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that

defendant Milliken did not follow the guidelines established by
the Board of Pardons, the Division of Correction, and the State
of Utah, in releasing an inmate from the Utah State Prison, and
that the defendant Milliken released Kenneth Roberts from the
Utah State Prison on his signature alone, and that defendant
Milliken failed to have his decision to release Kenneth Roberts
reviewed by the Screening Committee of the Board of Pardons, and
failed to comply with other requirements for release of inmates
established by the Board of Pardons, the Division of Corrections,
the Department of Social Services and the State of Utah.
11.

Upon information and belief, the claimant alleges

that once Kenneth Roberts was released from the Utah State

d CHRISTIAN. P.C.
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Prison, that the State of Utah oy and tnrougn tne Board of Pardons and the Board of Adult Probation and Parole failed to supervise adequately Kenneth Roberts once he had left their custody
and control.
12.
releasing

As a result of the State defendants1 conduct in

Kenneth

Roberts

into

the

public

at

large,

Kenneth

Roberts was able to affect the attack on the claimant and inflict
the injuries and damages to the complaint complained of herein.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
1.
tions

of

Claimant references and incorporates within allega-

Paragraphs

1 through

12 of

the

General

Allegations

contained above.
2.

That William Milliken and other unidentified State

employees, herein referred to as John Does I through III, were
negligent,

willful, wanton,

reckless

and

grossly

negligent

in

releasing Kenneth Roberts from the Utah State Prison.
3.

As a direct and proximate cause of Kenneth Roberts'

release, claimant sustained grievous personal injuries, past and
future medical expenses in an amount subsequently to be determined,

disfiguring

losing
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permanent

injuries,

was

rendered

paraplegic

the use of her legs permanently, suffered psychological

_ c _
J

nd

emotional

trauma

requiring

past

and

future professional

herapy, suffered loss of body functions and requires specialized
quipment and care*
WHEREFORE, claimant seeks recovery from the State of
tah# the named agencies and the named individuals in the amount
f $4.3 Million.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
1.

Claimant references and incorporates within Para-

raphs 1 through 12 of the General Allegations and Paragraphs 1
hrough 3 of the First Claim for Relief as though fully set forth
erein.
2.

Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that

,he defendant William Milliken, acting in his capacity of the
lirector of the Division of Corrections, failed to comply with
,he established guidelines and criteria for release of prisoners
:rom the Utah State Prison.

That had the established guidelines

leen followed, Kenneth Roberts would not have been released from
.he Utah State Prison.
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3.

The actions of the Utah State Division of Correc-

tions and William Milliken, in failing to comply with the established criteria and guidelines for release of prisoners, proximately caused the injuries sustained by claimant, resulting from
the attack upon her by Kenneth Roberts.
WHEREFORE, claimant seeks recovery from the State of
Utah, the named

agencies and the named

individuals specified

herein in the amount of $4.3 Million.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
1.

Claimant references and incorporates within Para-

graphs 1 through 12 of the General Allegations and Paragraphs 1
through 3 of the First Claim for Relief and Paragraphs 1 through
3 of the Second Claim for Relief, as though fully set forth
herein.
2.

Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that

the individuals and agencies specified herein had actual knowledge of the violent, dangerous propensities of the Kenneth
Roberts.
3.

In spite of said knowledge, the individuals and

agencies herein*,named authorized the release of Kenneth Roberts
without complying with the established guidelines, requirements

t CHRISTUM PC
INEVS AT LAW
SOMMt*CtAU

• auiuoiNO
LAKt

CITY.

AM 8 4 1 1 1
1» 1 1 1 * 7 7 *

- 7 -

and procedures.

Further, that in spite of their knowledge as to

the dangerous propensities of the Kenneth Roberts, they failed to
supervise or oversee Kenneth Roberts once he was released from
the care and custody of the Utah State Prison and the Ogden
Community Correction Center Halfway House.
4.
defendants1

As a direct and proximate result of the State
failure to supervise Kenneth Roberts once he was

released, the claimant was attacked by the defendant Roberts and
sustained the injuries complained of herein.
WHEREFORE,

claimant

agencies, State of Utah, and

seeks

recovery

individual

from

the

named

defendants specified

herein, in the amount of $4.3 Million.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
1.
graphs

Claimant references and incorporates herein Para-

1 through

12 of the General Allegations, Paragraphs 1

through 3 of claimant's First Claim

for Relief, Paragraphs 1

through 3 of claimant's Second Claim for Relief and Paragraphs 1
through 4 of claimant's Third Claim for Relief, as though fully
set forth herein.
2.

The State of Utah, acting by and through its agent

William MilliKen, and other agents whose identity is, as yet,
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unknown

to

claimant, knowingly

and

willfully

paroled

and/or

released Kenneth Roberts from the Utah State Prison with a reckless disregard for life and safety of the claimant, as well as
other members of the public.
3.

Said willful and wanton conduct constitutes gross

negligence, and directly and proximately caused the unprovoked,
violent,

heinous, and

destructive

attack

upon the claimant,

resulting in the injuries referred to above.
WHEREFORE, claimant seeks recovery against the named
agencies, named individuals and the State of Utah in the amount
of $4.3 Million.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
1.

Claimant references and incorporates within Para-

graphs 1 through 12 of the General Allegations and Paragraphs 1
through 3 of the First Claim for Relief, Paragraphs 1 through 3
of the Second Claim for Relief, Paragraphs 1 through 4 of the
Third Claim for Relief and Paragraphs 1 through 3 of the Fourth
Claim for Relief, as though fully set forth herein.
2.

Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that

the defendant William Milliken, and other employees of the State
of Utah, yet to be identified, arranged to have Kenneth Roberts
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released from the Utah State Prison to the Ogden Community Correction Center Halfway House*
3.

The defendants, Milliken, and unidentified State

employees, made this arrangement knowing that the halfway house
was about to close for the Christmas Holidays and that Kenneth
Roberts would, therefore, not be at a halfway house and would be
released from the halfway house into the public at large.
4.

Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that

the individual State employees arranged to have Kenneth Roberts
released from the Utah State Prison to the halfway house as a
subterfuge

to release him from the prison prior to the date

established by the Utah State Board of Pardons in August of 1983.
5.

That the actions of defendants Milliken and other

as yet unidentified State employees, were outside the scope of
the Governmental Immunity Act contained in 63-30-10 U.C.A. (as
Amended,

1953); and as a direct and proximate result of the

individual State employees9 actions in enabling Kenneth Roberts
to be released to the public at large, the claimant suffered the
injuries complained of herein.
WHEREFORE, claimant seeks recovery from the State of
Utah, the Utah State Department of Social Services, William
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Milliken, State employees John Does I through III, in the amount
of $4.3 Million.
DATED this

Q

day of March, 1983.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

SHIELDS 6 SHIELDS

JEFE#gy'v\!Eij,rUN SHIELDS

AVOJjfneys for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Respondents
Brief by mailing four copies to George M. Haley of Haley & Stolebarger, Attorneys for Appellant, Tenth Floor Walker Center, 175
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and one copy to
Jeffrey Weston Shields, co-counsel for Appellant, at 50 South Main
Street, Suite 2001, Post Office Box 30815, Salt Lake City, Utah
84130, this 2nd day of September, 1986.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

^^hxiszj6j^l\er^C.
Vuller
Attorneys for Respondents.

